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Developing Countries: There is no WTO definition of “developing” countries. However, the 
Word Bank definition is all countries that are not regarded as high income countries according to 
the 2011 definition of the World Bank. According to this definition all countries with a GNI per 
capita lower than US$ 12 475 per annum will fall in to this category. 
 
Developed Countries: There is no WTO definition of “developed” countries. However, the 
Word Bank definition is all countries that are regarded as high income countries according to the 
2011 definition of the World Bank. According to this definition all countries with a GNI per 
capita from US$ 12 476 per annum will fall in to this category. 
 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a multilateral agreement regulating 
international trade. It was negotiated during the UN Conference on Trade and Employment and 
was the outcome of the failure of negotiating governments to create the International Trade 
Organization (ITO). GATT was signed in 1948 and lasted until 1993, when it was replaced by 
the World Trade Organization in 1995. 
 
Transition Economies: A transition economy or transitional economy is an economy which is 
changing from a centrally planned economy to a free market.
 
 Transition economies 
undergo economic liberalisation, where market forces set prices rather than a central planning 
organization. They are mainly former territories of the Soviet Union. 
 
International Monetary Fund: An organisation of 188 countries, working to foster global 
monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high 
employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty around the world. 
 
World Trade Organization: Is an organization that intends to supervise 
and liberalize international trade. The organization officially commenced on January 1, 1995 
under the Marrakech Agreement, replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), which commenced in 1948. The organization deals with regulation of trade between 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
participating countries; it provides a framework for negotiating and formalizing trade 
agreements, and a dispute resolution process aimed at enforcing participants' adherence to WTO 
agreements which are signed by representatives of member governments. 
 
World Bank: An international financial institution that provides loans to developing 
countries for capital programs. The World Bank's official goal is the reduction of poverty. 
According to the World Bank's Articles of Agreement (as amended effective 16 February 1989), 
all of its decisions must be guided by a commitment to promote foreign investment, international 
trade, and facilitate capital investment. This is distinguishable from the World Bank 
Group (WBG)  which is a family of five international organisations viz International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development; International Development Association ; International Finance 
Corporation ; Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes. The term "World Bank" generally refers to just the IBRD and IDA, 
whereas the term World Bank Group or WBG is used to refer to all five institutions collectively. 
 
Consensus: Is a group decision-making process that seeks the consent, not necessarily the 
agreement of participants and the resolution of objections. 
 
Ministerial Conference: The ministerial conference, which has to meet at least once every two 
year, is the highest decision making. The Ministerial Conference can take decisions on all 
matters under any of the multilateral trade agreements. 
 
Doha Round: The Doha Development Round or Doha Development Agenda (DDA) is the 
current trade-negotiation round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) which commenced in 
November 2001. Its objective is to lower trade barriers around the world, which will help 
facilitate the increase of global trade. As of 2008, talks have stalled over a divide on major 
issues, such as agriculture, industrial tariffs and non-tariff barriers, services, and trade remedies. 
 
Multilateral trading system: This refers to the system operated by the WTO. Most nations — 
including almost all the main trading nations — are members of the system. 
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CHAPTER I 
INSTITUTIONAL DIAGNOSIS: DECIPHERING THE PROBLEMS BESIEGING THE 
WTO DECISION-MAKING  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background of the Study 
 
International  organisations  use  one  or a combination  of  three  types  of  decision-  making 
rules for most  non-judicial  action:  ‘majoritarian’ (decisions  are taken by  a  majority vote  of 
member states,  and each member has one  vote);  ‘weighted  voting’  (decisions  are taken by  a 
majority or  super-majority,  with  each state assigned  votes  or other procedural powers  in 
proportion  to its population,  financial  contribution to  the organization,  or other factors); or 
‘sovereign  equality’.1 Sovereign equality has been taken to imply that all member states should 
have an equal voice in the deliberations of international associations of states.
2
 
 
A cursory comparative analysis of the decision making processes of the major 
international economic organisations viz the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank 
and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has been made to the effect that the IMF and World 
Bank are sometimes described as staff-driven organizations. By contrast, the WTO (whose entire 
budget is only a little more than the travel budget of the IMF)
3
 is member-driven in the sense that 
governments make and sign multilateral and plurilateral trade agreements among themselves, 
leaving the WTO Secretariat to provide administrative and technical support. The structure of the 
WTO is (at least in theory) more directly representative of member states than that of both the
                                                 
1
 Steinberg RH ‘In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO’, 
International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Spring 2002) 339. 
2
 Gaubatz KT ‘Democratic States and the Sovereign Equality Norm’ available at 
http://kktg.net/kurt/publications/pubs/Sovereign%20Equality.pdf accessed 23
rd
 September 2012. 
3
 Woods N and Narlikar A, ‘Governance and the limits of accountability: the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank’, 
International Social Science Journal Number 170, November 2001. Pp.569-583, p.570. 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, because decision-making at all levels 
of the WTO is member driven and because all states enjoy an equal vote.
4
  
 
In respect of the decision making processes of the IMF and the World Bank, in 
comparison with the WTO, a different approach of arriving at decisions by member states has 
been adopted. The weight of votes a member country has is dependent on the extent of their 
capitalisation at inception of formation of these two Bretton Woods institutions.  It has been 
noted that like at its sister organisation, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the distribution 
of votes at the World Bank was set up to reflect each member country’s comparative economic 
strength (based on a mix of reserves, international trade volumes and national income).
5
 The 
allocation of voting shares at the World Bank was accompanied by paid-in capital, the allocation 
of voting shares is also linked to the quota a country has in the IMF. Thus the link between the 
scale of financial backing provided to the Bank and the degree of decision-making power was 
established.
6
   
 
With regards to the WTO, Developing countries have become increasingly active.
7
 This 
has led to decision-making by consensus becoming a very contentious issue.  The concepts of 
consensus and unanimity in the WTO are consistent with the principle of sovereign equality. It 
could be said that the system of decision-making by consensus only worked in the pre-Uruguay 
Round years.
8
 The contention arises from the fact that European Union (EU) and the United 
States have dominated bargaining and outcomes at the WTO from its early years, despite 
                                                 
4
 Woods N and Narlikar A ‘Governance and the limits of accountability: the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank’, 
International Social Science Journal Number 170, November 2001 570. 
5
 Griffith-Jones S Governance of the World Bank accessed at 
http://stephanygj.net/papers/Governance_of_the_World_Bank._Paper_prepared_for_DFID.pdf (accessed 20 
September 2012) . 
6
 Griffith-Jones S ‘Governance of the World Bank’ available at 
http://stephanygj.net/papers/Governance_of_the_World_Bank._Paper_prepared_for_DFID.pdf  accessed 20
th
 
September 2012. 
7
 See generally Michalopaulos C ‘The Developing Countries in the WTO’ (1999) 22 World Economy 117–143.  
8
 Dube M ‘The Way Forward for the WTO: Reforming the Decision Making Process’ 2012 SAIIA Occasional Paper 
Number 118 10.  
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adherence to consensus decision-making.
9
 The power struggles between the developed, 
industrialised countries and the developing member states of the WTO had led to the collapse of 
the Seattle Ministerial Conference and Cancun talks.
10
   
 
1.2. STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
Theoretically, the decision-making of the WTO can be made by equal-voting of member 
countries.
11
 However, since the inception of the GATT in 1947, the predecessor to the WTO, 
there has never been a single casting of votes in the multilateral trading system.
12
 The 
organisational culture of the WTO is that decisions are normally taken by consensus. Consensus 
in the WTO means explicit or implicit acceptance by all members of an agreement that is 
superior to any offered in the talks.
13
  
 
Due to a wide array of issues covered by the scope of the WTO in comparison to the 
GATT which was focused on tariffs, and viewed as a rich nations club, developing nations have 
taken active participation in the WTO negotiations.
14
 As a result of the expanded membership of 
the multilateral trading system from twenty-three members of the GATT in 1947, to one hundred 
and fifty seven member states of the WTO as at 24
th
 August 2012,
15
 consensus building has 
become a very difficult endeavour for the WTO. In order to avoid deadlock, a system of Green 
room meetings was introduced at the critical stages of the Tokyo (1971-79) and the Uruguay 
(1986-94) rounds, in this informal system adopted by the Director-General, small group of 
                                                 
9
 Jones K ‘Green room politics of the WTO and the WTO’s crisis of representation’, Progress in Development 
Studies 9, 4 (2009) 350. 
10
 See generally Narlikar A & Wikinson R ‘Collapse at the WTO: a Cancun post-mortem’ (2003) Third World 
Quarterly 25:3 460. 
11
 Nordström H ‘Participation of developing countries in the WTO-new evidence based on 2003 records’ available 
at www.noits.org/noits06/Final_Pap/Hakan_Nordstrom.pdf (accessed 21 September 2012).  
12
 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org1_e.htm#ministerial (accessed 24 September 2012). 
13
 Jones K, ‘Green room politics of the WTO and the WTO’s crisis of representation’, Progress in Development 
Studies 9, 4 (2009) 350. 
14
 Pauwelyn J, ‘New Trade Politics for the 21st Century’, Journal of International Economic Law 11(3) 573. 
15
 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm  (accessed 25 September 2012). 
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countries were invited to bargain over contentious issues which proved to be obstacles of 
progress.
16
 This informal procedure which has been adopted as well as part of the culture of the 
WTO has resulted in the exclusion of many developing countries not participating in the 
greenroom from key discussion and negotiation stages.
17
 
 
In light of the foregoing, there arises an academic need to assess the place of exclusive 
Greenroom meetings of the WTO within the broader context of the principle of sovereign 
equality in the decision making process of the multilateral trading system. The said examination 
from the position and/or perspective of developing countries shall be used to inform practical 
proposals for reform in the WTO decision-making process. 
 
1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
This research intends to probe fundamental constitutional framework and practical 
decision marking processes of the WTO, particularly the participation of developing and smaller 
economies. In that regard, the study raises the following questions: whether the interests and 
participation of developing countries are sufficiently safeguarded in the decision-making process 
of the WTO. It will also attempt to highlight the underlying conflicting and divergent economic 
and trading interests of developing nations vis-a-vis the developed nation in the multilateral 
trading system decision-making process. Furthermore, the paper will try to demonstrate that the 
prevailing informal decision making structure of the WTO viz the Greenroom meetings is 
inconsistent with the core principle of the WTO decision making. It shall also suggest workable 
areas of reforming the decision making process of the WTO to safeguard the interests of member 
states irrespective of their economies and size. 
 
The main research question which is, whether the interests and participation of 
developing countries are sufficiently safeguarded in the decision-making process of the WTO 
                                                 
16
  Jones K ‘Green room politics of the WTO and the WTO’s crisis of representation’ (2009) 9(4) Progress in 
Development Studies 350. 
17
 See generally Jones K ‘Green room politics of the WTO and the WTO’s crisis of representation’ (2009) 9(4) 
Progress in Development Studies 349-357. 
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would be resolved by considering three sub-facets; what is the structure and background of 
decision making process of the multilateral trading system; what are the constraints to the 
principle of sovereign equality and transparency in the WTO decision making process; and 
finally whether in the light of the developments in the multilateral trading system and 
negotiations environment there exists a justifiable need to reform the WTO decision making 
system. 
 
 The objectives of the study are as follows: 
 
 To discuss the concept of sovereign equality in the multilateral trading system decision 
making system within the constitutional framework of the WTO in contra-distinction with other 
international economic institutions. Further to discuss the dichotomy between WTO 
constitutional provisions that guarantees equality of participation of member state and the 
prevailing practice of Greenroom meetings.  
 
   The study would also attempt to demonstrate with an aid of relevant examples the 
underlying power-struggles between developing and developed countries over the equal 
involvement of the former in the decision-making procedures of the WTO, which can lead to 
paralysis of the multilateral trading system. 
 
 Lastly, to analyse the developments in the WTO, particularly the position of the 
developing nations and protection of their interests during negotiation stages in the WTO make 
necessary recommendations and/or conclusions. 
  
1.4. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The study will provide critical analysis of the WTO decision making process and the 
position of developing countries in the multilateral trading system negotiations in light of the 
stalled Doha Round which its status is uncertain. The study will further contribute to academic 
assessment of the decision making framework of the WTO and proposals for reform to cater for 
new dynamics and the ever expanding membership which is necessary for providing much 
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needed legitimacy and acceptance for the WTO decisions. 
 
1.5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
As a desktop type of research, a thorough review of available literature would be made. On 
primary sources regard will be given to international treaties and/or conventions would be 
consulted whenever necessary viz WTO Agreements, WTO statistics, and WTO Members’ 
proposals where applicable. The secondary sources reference will be taken from various 
background papers, working papers of various authors, academic or scholarly journal articles as 
well as other academic material such as textbooks would be paid regard to. Internet sources of 
recent and updated information will also be referred to. 
  
1.6. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Jones’s18journal article entitled Green room politics and the WTO’s crises of 
representation discusses the Green room meetings of the WTO within the broader organisational 
framework. It briefly discusses the historical development of the Green room practice in the 
consensus building process. It further notes the benefits of resorting to the informal meetings and 
their necessity for arriving at consensus. The article concludes by suggesting need for reforms 
without proposing what can be done to address the imbalances complained of.  
 
New Trade Politics for the 21
st
 Century an article authored by Pauwelyn
19
 points out that 
the WTO has not adapted to changes, remains centred and continues to follow the same 
negotiating techniques the GATT followed more than 60 years ago. It further points out the fact 
of explosion of membership of the WTO, the bulk of the majority being the developing countries 
and economies in transition. The article also discusses the ‘closed politics’ of the GATT/WTO 
                                                 
18
  Jones K, ‘Green room politics of the WTO and the WTO’s crisis of representation’, Progress in Development 
Studies 9, 4 (2009) 349-357. 
19
 Pauwelyn J, ‘New Trade Politics for the 21st Century’, Journal of International Economic Law (2008)11(3) 559-
573. 
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system. This work however, does not in sufficient details discuss the procedural aspects of the 
decision making process, the analysis is more econometric than legal. 
 
Narlikar and Wilkinson in their joint journal article Collapse at the WTO: a Cancun post-
mortem analyses the collapse of the WTO Ministerial Conference in 2003 in Cancun, Mexico. 
They posit that the collapse was due to the deep-rooted malady within the WTO and that the 
multilateral trading system is riddled with some serious flaws of institutional design. The authors 
conclude that the WTO system in order to move forward and benefit its members, the inequality 
issues needs to be addressed directly and urgently.  Even though the authors discuss the 
inequality and inefficiency of the WTO decision making process, it is general in its discussion 
not focusing son Green room meetings and discussing the phenomena extensively. 
 
One of the latest additions in this subject matter authored by Dube
20
 entitled The Way 
Forward for the WTO: Reforming the Decision-Making Process discusses the failure to reach a 
decision in the ongoing negotiations dubbed the Doha Round. The learned author posits that the 
Doha Round remains in limbo and, with it, the multilateral trading system. She further strongly 
argues that increasing popularity of regional and bilateral trading agreements is indicative of the 
WTO members’ frustrations with the latter. The paper notwithstanding the fact that it is making 
some cogent institutional reforms does not differentiate between short-term and long-term 
implementation of the same. 
 
1.7. CHAPTER BREAKDOWN 
 
This paper is intended to be divided into five chapters:  
 
Chapter one comprises the background to the research, the research problem and 
questions, the objectives of the study, the methodology, and a literature review. 
                                                 
20
 Dube M ‘The Way Forward for the WTO: Reforming the Decision Making Process’ (2012) SAIIA Occasional 
Paper Number 118 1-30.  
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 The second chapter comprises an analysis of the brief background of the multilateral 
trading system decision making process, from the GATT to the WTO in comparison to other 
international economic organisations viz the IMF and WTO. 
  The third chapter shall discuss the constraints to the principle of sovereign equality 
and transparency in the WTO decision making process. Specifically the [non] participation of the 
developing nations and transition economies in Green room meeting. It shall further attempt to 
illustrate the underlying tension between developing nations and their developed counterparts.  
 
Chapter four shall point out the impact of the negotiation procedures on the multilateral 
trading system making specific references to the Seattle and Cancun Ministerial conference, and 
to the stalled Doha Round of negotiation.  
 
The foregoing chapters will pave way for the articulation of the conclusions and 
recommendations in the fifth and final chapter. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE WORLD BANK, IMF AND WTO: DECISION MAKING IN [UN] HOLY 
TRINITY
21
 OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 
 
2. INTRODUCTION 
2.1. Historical perspective on the establishment of the New International 
Economic Order  
 
Global social policy is currently managed through a variety of institutions in addition to the 
WTO, including in particular what are popularly called the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs): 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF or the Fund) and the World Bank Group (WBG).
22
 These 
institutions came into being almost seventy years ago and are playing an important and at times 
controversial role in the world economy. 
 
The 1930s was a period when the world experienced one of the worst economic 
recessions known in human history referred to as the Great Depression, which demonstrated that 
the pursuit of nationalistic beggar-thy-neighbour policies can have dramatic and devastating 
effects.
23
 In order to prevent a repetition of this destructive experience, the Bretton Woods 
system consisting of the IMF and the World Bank was created in 1944 to post World War II 
economic system.
24
 
 
The establishment of the international economic order as a necessary framework to be out 
in place as institutional mechanisms to prevent future armed conflict of global scale was 
                                                 
21
 Adapted from Peet R Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank and WTO, 2 ed (2012). 
22
 Garcia FJ ‘Justice, The Bretton Woods Institutions and the Problem of Inequality’, Boston College Law School 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No.158 June 10, 2008 .4. 
23
 Shukla SP ‘From GATT to WTO and Beyond’, UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research 
(UNI/WIDER) Working Paper No. 195 2. 
24
 Liebscher K ‘The Importance of the Bretton Woods Institutions for Small Countries Opening Address’, 
Proceedings of OeNB Workshops No.3 entitled ‘60 years of Bretton Woods- The Governance of International 
Financial System-Looking Ahead’, June 20-22 2004 10. 
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discussed when the World War II was still being heavily fought.  The allies, specifically the 
United States and the United Kingdom agreed to the general objectives of the post-war economic 
order through the conclusion of the Atlantic Charter of August 1941.
25
 The specific details of this 
new order were then developed, in stages, through the negotiations that produced the United 
States-United Kingdom Lend-Lease Agreement of February 1942, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) Agreement of July 1944 and the United States proposed charter of December 
1945.
26
 
 
2.1.1. International economic constitutionalism  
 
The World Bank
27
 and the International Monetary are commonly referred to as ‘Bretton Woods 
Institutions’ as reference to their ‘place of birth’. In that regard Wood notes that in 1994 in 
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, United States of America a global conference with an object to 
establish global economic rules which would prevent replay of the Great Depression and its 
aftermath was attended by ‘one and half parties”.28 The metaphorical statement ‘one and half 
parties’ US was clearly the most powerful country at the table and so ultimately was able to 
impose its will on the others having just emerged from the war with economic superiority over 
its Western Allies,
29
, including an often-dismayed Britain which can be said to be a ‘limping 
partner’ in that it had little of a choice because of it economic embarrassment to resist the 
demands and economic leadership of the USA.
30
 
 
                                                 
25
 Irwin DA, Mavroidis PC & Sykes AO ‘The Genesis of the GATT’ 2008 New York: Cambridge University Press 
p.14. Available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/workshops/international/archive/pdf/Irwin,%20D..pdf (accessed 
17 January 2013) 
26
 Hudec RE Developing Countries in the GATT/WTO Legal System, 2
 
ed (1987) 20. 
27
 Hudec RE Developing Countries in the GATT/WTO Legal System, 2 ed (1987) 20. 
28
 Woods N ‘Bretton Woods Institutions’ in Weiss TG & Daws S (Eds) Oxford Handbook on The United Nations 
(2006) 1. 
29
 Woods N ‘Bretton Woods Institutions’ in Weiss TG and Daws S (Eds) Oxford Handbook on The United Nations 
(2006) 4. 
30
 Available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system (accessed 13 May 2013). 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
Ikenberry makes a very critical jurisprudential assertion when he states that the core 
principles and values embedded and/or enshrined in the Bretton Woods accord was an 
unprecedented experiment in international economic constitution building.
31
 The results of the 
global conference in New Hampshire was the establishment of an international rule making 
institutions for post-war monetary and financial relation as a step in the historic reopening of the 
world economy. The Anglo-American agreements established sophisticated rules that would 
attempt to reconcile openness and trade expansion with the commitments of national 
governments to full employment and economic stabilisation.  
 
The main function of international financial institutions today, which are anchored on the 
international economic constitutionalism developed in the Bretton Woods, is to provide the best 
framework for the governance of globalization so that this process becomes a win-win outcome, 
in which all economies ultimately benefit through productivity and growth effects.
32
 This system 
is one of the core institutions which international economic law is premised upon, the basis 
which world peace and security is based on.
33
 
 
The original Bretton Woods agreement also included plans for an International Trade 
Organisation (ITO) but these lay dormant until the WTO was created in the early 1990s.
34
 The 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which had a de facto role as an international 
organisation before the creation of the WTO in that sense is often viewed by some as one third of 
the Bretton Woods system that was created after World War II to ensure a stable trade and 
economic world environment.
35
 The modus operandi of the WTO and its sister organisations, 
the World Bank and the IMF emphasise in their development discourses the role of trade 
                                                 
31
 Ikenberry GJ ‘The Political Origins of Bretton Woods’ in Michael D. Bordo & Eichengreen B (ed) ‘A 
Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform’ (1993) 155. 
32
 Liebscher K ‘The Importance of the Bretton Woods Institutions for Small Countries Opening Address’ 
Proceedings of OeNB Workshops No.3 entitled ‘60 years of Bretton Woods- The Governance of International 
Financial System-Looking Ahead’  June 20-22 2004 8. 
33
 See generally Raustiala K ‘Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law’ (2003) 6(4) 
Journal of International Economic Law 841-878. 
34
 http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/item.shtml?x=320747 (accessed 13 May 2013). 
35
 Available at http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/intl/guides/gattwto/ (accessed 13 May 2013). 
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mainstreaming (through the strengthening of the private sector) as a development tool, while 
spreading the political idea that trade is not only an economic tool but also a political vehicle to 
achieve international peace and social stability worldwide.
36
 The overarching philosophy 
underpinning the new international economic order is that development through trade and its 
consequent macro-economic adjustments is to be reached in long run and thus this political 
spectrum of ideas highlights that international trade will carry development.
37
 
 
2.2. Bretton Woods Voting Model: General overview 
 
Weighed voting is fundamental to the workings of the IMF and World Bank. The principle that 
all member countries have the right to vote but cast different numbers of votes to reflect key 
differences between them was enshrined in the original Bretton Woods constitutions and has 
dominated their work ever since.
38
 This has been shown to have resulted in a severe democratic 
imbalance with a voting structure that is massively biased against the developing and poor 
countries. 
 
It is customary, in the language of the Bretton Woods Institutions, to refer to the number 
of votes a member country has as its ‘voting power’. No doubt this is what its voting power is 
intended to be, but it is certainly not its power in the true sense of the term, but its weight, in the 
sense of weighted voting.
39
  
 
                                                 
36
 Iorio M ‘Global Governance, International Development Discourses and National Policy-Making: Highlights of 
Critical Issues’, International Gender and Trade Network Discussion Paper, p.6. Available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/posp68_igtn_e.pdf  (accessed 31 December 2012). 
37
 Iorio M ‘Global Governance, International Development Discourses and National Policy-Making: Highlights of 
Critical Issues’, International Gender and Trade Network Discussion Paper, p.6. Available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/posp68_igtn_e.pdf (accessed 31 December 2012). 
38
 Vestergaard J ‘The World Bank and the Emerging World Order: Adjusting to Multi-polarity at the Second 
Decimal Point’ Danish Institute for International Studies Report 2011:05. Available at www.diis.dk/.../RP2011-05-
World-Bank-voice-reform_web.pdf  (accessed 6th January 2013). 
39
 See Leech D & Leech R ‘Voting Power in the Bretton Woods Institutions’ (2005) 22(4) Homo Oeconomicus  
605–627  
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2.2.1. The World Bank 
2.2.1.1. Organisational Structure of the IBRD 
 
As a multilateral institution the World Bank is owned by the governments of its 188 member 
countries. The Bank is run like a cooperative, and the member countries are shareholders of the 
Bank, with shares based on the size of each country’s economy.  
 
The World Bank is an international financial institution that provides loans to developing 
countries for capital programs.
40
  It came into existence on December 27, 1945 following 
international ratification of the agreements reached at the United Nations Monetary and Financial 
Conference of July 1 to July 22, 1944 in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire.
41
 The World Bank's 
official goal is the poverty reduction. According to the World Bank's Articles of Agreement (as 
amended effective 16 February 1989), all of its decisions must be guided by a commitment to 
promote foreign investment, international trade, and facilitate capital investment.  
 
The World Bank is distinguishable from the World Bank Group (WBG)
42
  which is a 
family of five international organisations viz International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD); International Development Association (IDA); International Finance 
Corporation (IFC); Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 
 
                                                 
40
Available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20653660~menuPK:72312~pageP
K:51123644~piPK:329829~theSitePK:29708,00.html (accessed 12 May 2013). 
41
Available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/International_Bank_for_Reconstruction_and_Developmen
t.html (accessed 12 May 2013). 
42
Available at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/world-bank-group.asp (accessed 12 May 2013). 
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 The term ‘World Bank’ generally refers to just the IBRD whereas the term World Bank 
Group or WBG is used to refer to all five institutions collectively.
43
 For the avoidance of doubt, 
for purposes of this research, the World Bank shall refer solely to the IBRD to the exclusion of 
other constituent organisations of the World Bank Group. To become a member of the Bank, 
under the IBRD Articles of Agreement, a country must first join the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Membership in IDA, IFC and MIGA are conditional on membership in IBRD.
44
 
 
At the apex of the leadership structure, the shareholders viz member states are represented 
by a Board of Governors, which consists of Ministers of Finance or Development and Central 
Bank Governors. The governors meet annually and have the ultimate responsibility for making 
decisions and maintaining oversight of the Bank. However, prior to 2010, there were 24 
Executive Directors who sat on the Executive Board made the day-to-day decisions. From 
November 2010 the number of Executive Directors increased by one to 25.
45
 
 
Each of the Executive Directors represents either a single country or a group of countries. 
Only the five largest shareholders (France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States) appoint their own Executive Director, while the other countries are grouped into 
constituencies that are represented by one Executive Director (for example, one sub-Saharan 
African Executive Director represents 22 countries). China, the Russian Federation, and Saudi 
Arabia each elect its own Executive Director.
46
 The other Executive Directors are elected by the 
                                                 
43
 House of Commons International Development Committee, The World Bank Fourth Report of Session 2010-11 
Vol. 1, House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited. Available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmintdev/606/606.pdf (accessed 12 May 2013). 
44
Available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:22427666~menuPK:8336899~page
PK:51123644~piPK:329829~theSitePK:29708,00.html (accessed 12 May 2013) 
45
Available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/0,,contentMDK:22494
475~menuPK:64020004~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036,00.html (accessed 13 May 2013). 
46
Available at 
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other members. The voting power distribution differs from agency to agency within the World 
Bank Group. The Executive Directors usually meet twice a week for general oversight of the 
Bank. 
 
2.2.1.2. Voting system 
 
The voting system of the Executive Board of Directors is based on the shareholding of the 
member countries that have appointed or elected a given Executive Director. Thus, while it is the 
same persons that are on the Board of Executive Directors of the IBRD, IDA and the IFC, their 
voting power depends on which of these three WBG bodies a given vote is cast for, given that 
countries’ relative shareholding is not the same for each of these three bodies. 
 
 Most decisions require a simple majority, although there are some important exceptions 
to this rule. Special majorities are required for issues such as capital increases and amendment of 
the Articles of Agreement.
47
 Amendment of Articles requires approval by the Board of 
Governors, support from at least 60% of member countries and at least 85% of total voting 
power.
48
 The latter criterion is what effectively gives the US a veto on fundamental changes in 
the Bank. Given that the US has just over 15% of total voting power, no amendment of the 
Articles can be decided without the support of the US. 
 
Increases in the Bank’s capital also require a special majority, although here only a 75% 
majority applies
49, however, it is worthy to note that in the context of an increase of the Bank’s 
capital, each and every member country has a right to subscribe to a proportionate share of the 
                                                 
47
 See generally Article II and Article VIII of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of 
Agreement available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-articlesofagreement.pdf 
(accessed 17 January 2013). 
48
 Article VIII of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-articlesofagreement.pdf (accessed 17 January 
2013). 
49
 Article II Section 2(b) of the Articles of Agreement of the IBRD reads “The capital stock may be increased when 
the Bank deems it advisable by a three-fourths majority of the total voting power.” 
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increase. This in effect means that no member country can have its share of total shares reduced 
without its concurrence, a principle known as ‘pre-emptive rights’ or right of first refusal. Pre-
emptive rights on share issue are a company law principle found in various English speaking 
common law jurisdictions.
50
The implication is that, since any realignment of voting power 
requires a selective capital increase, voting power reform can only be undertaken if all 188 
member countries agree unanimously. 
 
When the Executive Board makes decisions about loans and other policies, voting is not 
based on a one vote- per-country rule. Instead, voting power is weighted and is based on a 
country’s quota. Under the current quota formula, each member country receives a base of 250 
votes. Additionally, member countries receive votes based on the size of their economies (they 
receive one additional vote for each share of stock held by that country, which depends on that 
country’s relative economic and financial strength). The allocation of quotas and the relationship 
between the IBRD and the IMF is neatly summed up in the World Bank Group website as 
follows: 
 
According to IBRD Articles of Agreements membership in the Bank is open to all 
members of the IMF. A country applying for membership in the Fund is required 
to supply data on its economy, which are compared with data from other member 
countries whose economies are similar in size. A quota is then assigned, 
equivalent to the country's subscription to the Fund, and this determines its voting 
power in the Fund. This quota is also used to determine the number of shares 
allotted to each new member country in the Bank. All members of the Bank 
receive votes consisting of share votes (one vote for each share of the Bank's 
capital stock held by the member) plus basic votes (calculated so that the sum of 
all basic votes is equal to 5.55 percent of the sum of basic votes and share votes 
for all members).
51
 
 
                                                 
50
 See generally Naude T ‘Rights of First Refusal or Preferential Rights to Contract: A Historical Perspective on a 
Controversial Legal Figure’ (2004) 1 Stellenbosch Law Review 66. 
51
 Available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNALN (accessed 13 May 2013). 
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The United States is the largest shareholder and it carries 15.85 of the vote which as 
discussed above effectively translates into a veto power. Member countries that have larger 
shares of the total quota have larger voting percentages.
52
 Therefore, wealthier countries hold 
more voting power than the poorer countries. 
 
2.2.1.3. A glimpse into the 2010 reforms 
 
The then president of the World Bank Robert Zoellick expressed the vision and desire to reform 
the decision-making processes within the World Bank Group generally as follows: 
 
A modernized [World Bank Group] must represent the international economic 
realities of the early 21st Century… [W]e are significantly increasing developing 
and transition country voice across the Group… This realignment strengthens our 
ability to continue to support the smallest poor members, and demonstrates that a 
greater say for emerging and developing countries brings with it greater 
responsibility for the financial soundness of the Bank Group.
53
 
 
The World Bank introduced reforms on the voting power of its members which came into  
effect in 2010. The said reforms as reflected by the diagram below resulted in the spreading 
through of some of the voting power of certain members which have since been   gained by other 
members.
54
 The 2010 reforms introduced an office of the Executive Director which its member 
is voted in by three (3) African countries on their own as a constituency viz Angola, Nigeria and 
                                                 
52
 U.S Department of Treasury International Programs, ‘Justification of Budget Appropriations FY2013 Budget 
Request’, p.13. Available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/about/budgetperformance/Documents/FY2013_CPD_FINAL_508.pdf (accessed 13
 
May 
2013). 
53
 Zoellick R speech quoted in Wade R. H & Vaentergaard J ‘The Future of the World Bank: Why More “Voice 
Reform” Is Needed’ 2. Available at 
 http://cde.williams.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/The-Future-of-the-World-Bank_RWade.pdf (accessed 6 
January 2013) 
54
 Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/22553921/DC2010-
006(E)Voice.pdf (accessed 17 January 2013). 
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South Africa
55
 which countries can be said to be leading economies in Africa regarding their 
GDP. 
 
It is quite critical to note that the sole veto power wielding shareholder is still holding 
tight to its veto. In effect, the ingrained imbalance of a practically one member controlling stake 
situation still exists, what has happened is that few of the emerging economies have temporarily 
been appeased by increasing their shareholding. The spreading over of those shares did not result 
in the sovereign nations being equal in the decision making structures of the World Bank.  
 
The following diagram shows major shareholder of the World Bank, how their voting 
strengths were before and after the reform of 2010: 
 
 
Source:
56
 
 
According to the World Bank the developing and transition countries gained 3.13 per 
cent of the voting shares at IBRD, bringing them to 47.19 per cent which represented a total shift 
of 4.59 per cent since 2008.
57
 However, it has been observed that despite the said reforms, grave 
                                                 
55
 Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-
1215526322295/BankExecutiveDirectors.pdf (accessed 13
 
 May 2013) 
56
Available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2010-04/27/content_9778666.htm (accessed 18 January 
2013). 
57
 Massion N ‘The poor pay but the rich rule the World Bank’ The Brunei Times 22 May 2010. Available at 
http://www.bt.com.bn/features/2010/05/22/poor-pay-rich-rule-world-bank (accessed 18 January 2013). 
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imbalances still remain in that the 78 of countries eligible to borrow from IBRD still have only a 
third of voting power (34.1 per cent) in comparison to the more than one quarter of votes held by 
the 27 countries of the European Union.
58
 African countries gained a mere 0.19 per cent more of 
the newly available quota of votes in 2010 reform process, this has not changed the bargaining 
power of African countries by increasing any of its.  
 
In reality then, high-income countries still hold between themselves almost 61% of the 
vote, with middle-income countries getting under 35%, and low-income countries a mere 4.46%. 
In effect deep rooted imbalances which have historically existed in the governance system of the 
World Bank remains notwithstanding the purported reforms. Inequalities of power between 
sovereign state are entrenched in the Bretton Woods system as reflected in the World Banking 
voting power, the imbalance which the almost 70 years of existence of this institution  has not 
cured. The same nations which emerged victorious in World War II are still dominant and hold a 
controlling stake in the World Bank, a position which leaves the governance of this institution at 
their mercy in a literal and figurative sense. The United States of America hold a veto power in 
the World Bank, a weapon of governance that no any other nation possesses. 
 
2.2.2. International Monetary Fund 
 
The historical determination of voting structure and power of constituent states of the IMF is 
succinctly captured by Van Houtven whose views are not only academic but most importantly 
practical due to his past association with the IMF. The distinguisher who has served Secretary to 
the IMF and Counsellor to the managing Director for a period of 19 years notes as follows: 
 
Each member country is assigned a quota, which is its participation in the capital 
of the IMF and determines its voting power. In addition, quotas determine each 
member’s share in any allocations of SDRs. The original formula used at Bretton 
                                                 
58
  Horton A ‘Analysis of World Bank voting reforms: Governance remains illegitimate and outdated’ (2004) 1 
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Woods for the calculation of the quotas of the 45 countries that participated in the 
conference included as economic variables national income, reserves, external 
trade, and export fluctuations. The quota formula was, and continues to be, 
directed in the first place at meeting the capital requirements of the institution.
59
 
 
The above observation is the interpretation of the constitutional documents establishing 
the IMF as agreed upon by the negotiating parties during the Bretton Woods conference. In that 
regard, Mountford argues that any assessment of the IMF’s governance structure must start from 
the Articles of Agreement, which are the IMF’s “constitution” which establish its purpose; 
provide for the establishment of the main organs and define their relative roles in a decision-
making system, delineate other significant governance features (notably weighted voting and 
special majorities), embody important underlying principles of governance.
60
 
 
2.2.2.1. Determination of a Quota 
 
When a country joins the IMF, it is assigned an initial quota in the same range as 
the quotas of existing members that are broadly comparable in economic size and 
characteristics.
61
 The IMF uses a quota formula to guide the assessment of a member’s 
relative position. The current quota formula is a weighted average of GDP (weight of 
50 percent), openness (30 percent), economic variability (15 percent), and international 
reserves (5 percent).
62
 For this purpose, GDP is measured as a blend of GDP based on market 
exchange rates (weight of 60 percent) and on PPP exchanges rates (40 percent). The formula 
also includes a “compression factor” that reduces the dispersion in calculated quota shares 
across members. 
                                                 
59
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Accountability’ Pamphlet Series No. 53 International Monetary Fund, Washington DC (2002), p.5. 
60
 Mountford A ‘The Historical Development of IMF Governance’ IEO Background Paper, Independent Evaluation 
Office of the International Monetary Fund May 2008 5. 
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Quotas are denominated in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), the IMF’s unit of account. 
The largest member of the IMF is the United States, with a current quota of SDR 42.1 billion 
(about $64 billion), and the smallest member is Tuvalu, with a current quota of SDR 1.8 
million (about $2.7 million).
63
 
 
2.2.2.2. Quota as determinant for weighted voting 
 
Woods in his seminal work notes that despite the practice of Boards work by consensus, all 
their work is underpinned by an awareness of the voting power.
64
 The quota largely determines a 
member's voting power in IMF decisions. Each IMF member’s votes are comprised of basic 
votes plus one additional vote for each SDR 100,000 of quota.
65
 The 2008 reform fixed the 
number of basic votes at 5.502 percent of total votes. The current number of basic votes 
represents close to a tripling of the number prior to the effectiveness of the 2008 reform. 
 
It worthwhile to note at this juncture that in the Bretton Woods system of governance 
member states representation on the Executive Board is not equal, only few large shareholders in 
both the IMF and the World Bank have their own seats and these shareholders are United States 
of America, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, China, Russia and Saudi Arabia.
66
 It 
is common cause that there is no African country seating in the Board as of right. The 25 
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E-book 2. Available at 
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Executive Directors sit on the Executive Boards of the World Bank and 24 Executive Directors 
of the IMF make the day-to-day decisions, each Executive Director represents either a single 
country or a group of countries.
67
 In the World Bank, the five largest shareholders appoint their 
own Executive Director, while the other countries are grouped into constituencies that are 
represented by one Executive Director (for example, two sub-Saharan African Executive 
Directors, one representing 19 countries and the other representing Angola, South Africa and 
Nigeria).
68
 
 
2.2.2.3. Special majority and the United States of America’s veto power 
 
In series of meetings in 1966-67 during the negotiations on the main features of the future 
Special Drawing Rights (SDR’s) a new requirement for a special majority being 85% of the total 
votes of the Board of Governors on certain issues was introduced. It gives certain members or 
group of members a veto power over decisions which require this special majority of weighted 
voted casted over an issue or set of issues.
69
 
 
The effect of this special majority requirement has led to a situation that only one 
member state has an individual veto power over major decisions. The United States of America 
as the only member with more than 15% of the weighted votes in the IMF, which currently 
stands at 16.75% of the votes has a veto power of special majority decision as all other 
members.
70
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In an instance when the 85 per cent majority vote is required to pass any decisions 
requiring a super-majority, this gives the US veto power in all but one of the institutions of the 
World Bank Group - at the IDA the US representative has around 13 per cent of votes. In this 
case the US and any one of 23 of the 24 remaining representatives may combine to block any 
critical decisions.
71
 
 
The inequality of the member states is glaring and beyond doubt is that one member out 
of currently 188 member international institutions can by its sole and discretionary action block 
the decisions of the organisation and yet other countries do not have similar power. No decision 
requiring special majority can pass with8ut the approval and support of the United States of 
America including the reforms to democratise the World Bank and the IMF. This basically 
means that these institutions are unlikely to be significantly be reformed without the agreement 
of the United States of America. 
 
2.3 BIRDS-EYE VIEW OF THE REFORMS: STEPPING TOWARDS 
DEMOCRATISATION OF THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM? 
 
Following the reform in decision-making in its Bretton Woods sister organisation, the IMF has 
been engaged in internal discussion for reforming its own governance structure.  The quotas are 
regularly reviewed every five years and adjusted to suit changes in economic positions of power 
when necessary. 
72
 
 
The IMF is engaged in a new round of negotiations over governance reform, but 
acrimony persists and already-agreed changes remain unimplemented. It was initially thought 
that the review  of the current voting quotas as sanction by the highest decision making body of 
                                                 
71
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the IMF, the Board of Governors to be completed by January 2013 yet decision seems to be far 
from sight.
73
  
 
The envisaged reform in the governance structure of the IMF among other sanctioned the 
re-alignment of balance of power though not in a radical manner in tilting the scale from 
traditionally powerful shareholders. The IMF secretariat sums up the effects of the reform as 
captured in the 14th General Review of Quotas will as follows: 
 
 double quotas from approximately SDR 238.4 billion to approximately 
SDR 476.8 billion, (about US$720 billion at current exchange rates).  
 shift more than 6 percent of quota shares from over-represented to under-
represented member countries.  
 shift more than 6 percent of quota shares to dynamic emerging market and 
developing countries (EMDCs).  
 Significantly realign quota shares. China will become the 3rd largest member 
country in the IMF, and there will be four EMDCs (Brazil, China, India, and 
Russia) among the 10 largest shareholders in the Fund, and 
 preserve the quota and voting share of the poorest member countries. This 
group of countries is defined as those eligible for the low-income Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) and whose per capita income fell below 
US$1,135 in 2008 (the threshold set by the International Development 
Association) or twice that amount for small countries.
74
 
 
The seemingly existence of a deadlock over implementation of the 2010 proposed 
reforms reflects divergent views of the shareholders, the emerging and developing nations are 
desirous of having far reaching reforms, while developed nations will naturally protect their long 
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power in the governance of this intergovernmental organisation.
75
 The main debates in the quota 
formula review are over the inclusion of factors that measure trade openness and volatility, as 
well as the balance between the market-exchange-rate valuation of GDP with the purchasing 
power parity (PPP) valuation of GDP. Developing countries prefer the PPP valuation.
76
  
 
The IMF board discussed the formula again at end of September 2012, but failed to come 
to an agreement. There has been a tendency for the negotiations to take place at G20 finance 
ministers' meetings, a body which has no representative structure and excludes most of the 
world’s countries thus creating informal structures of decision-making within the IMF which 
exists without the reach of the IMF governance structures.
77
 
 
2.4 DECISION-MAKING IN MULTILATERAL TRADING SYTEMS: FROM GATT TO 
WTO 
 
The International Trade Organization (ITO) was planned while bitter fighting still raged around 
the world; it was intended to form the third leg of the post-war international economic 
arrangements, along with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
78
 The 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was established in 30 October 1947 before the 
signing of a more elaborate and comprehensive international agreement which sought to 
establish the ITO known as the Havanna Charter.
79
Largely because of political division within 
the United States that resulted from the compromises embedded in the institution and its Charter, 
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the ITO was never established.
80
 The free trade agenda was forced to balance on a thin branch - 
the provisional GATT. 
 
Unlike some if not most international and/or intergovernmental institutions, the GATT 
did not assign decision making power to its constituent members in proportion to their raw 
bargaining power, quite specifically the United Nation Security Council in which only five 
members have veto power; or the IMF in which voting is historically tied to cash contributions a 
member made.
81
 In the GATT each contracting party was given one vote, and a nation or class of 
nations is given formally superior voting power. From 1959 to 1994 the GATT was governed by 
consensus decision-making rule, since 1959 when developing countries joined the GATT in 
large numbers the primary decision-making rule was decisions must be arrived at through 
consensus.
82
 
 
The decision-making process in the WTO remains largely unchanged from that of its 
GATT predecessor. The WTO decision-making process continues to be guided by four key 
principles: the consensus-rule, one member-one vote, member-driven character and the 
importance of informal processes.
83
 Notwithstanding the fact that the constitutional documents of 
the GATT/WTO do provide for one member-one vote, voting itself virtually ceased to exists in 
1959, ever since decisions have been arrived at through consensus.
84
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The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO hereinafter ‘the Marrakesh Agreement’ 
clothe consensus as primary decision making mode of the WTO with constitutional protection, 
and voting to be resorted to when consensus cannot be reached. Article IX thereof provides that: 
 
WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by consensus followed 
under GATT 1947. Except as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be 
arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be decided by voting. At 
meetings of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council, each Member of 
the WTO shall have one vote. Where European Communities exercise their right 
to vote, they shall have a number of votes equal to the number of their member 
States which are members of the WTO. Decisions of the Ministerial Conference 
shall be taken by majority of the votes cast, unless otherwise provided in this 
Agreement or in the relevant Multilateral Trade Agreement.
85
 
 
The first footnote in Marrakesh Agreement explains the manner in which members of the 
WTO arrive at consensus; this is often referred to as ‘negative consensus’.86 However the 
important feature of the WTO decision-making process which distinguishes it from the Bretton 
Woods institutions as discussed above is the possession of veto-power inherent in all WTO 
members irrespective of economic size and/or might. Countries have equal voting power 
irrespective of their economic size; the public international law doctrine of sovereign equality of 
states finds strict application in WTO legal system.
87
 
 
The GATT system was characterised over and above the consensus and one member-one-
vote manner of decision-making especially after the rapid expansion of membership by informal 
processes and procedures of discussion of issues to facilitate and/or nurture consensus. The 
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Green Room is an informal institution in the decision making-process of the GATT which has 
been subsumed into the WTO processes and culture. The “green room” literally refers to the 
décor of the Director-Generals boardroom.
88
 Within the language of decision-making in the 
WTO it the metaphor for meetings called on informal basis by the Director-General which do not 
fall within any established structures of the WTO; these meetings are called to discuss particular 
aspects of the negotiations. Attendance is at the discretion of the convenor of the Green Room, 
however, tradition has emerged that certain countries have permanent seats in the Green Room to 
the exclusion of the majority members of the WTO which are developing countries.
89
 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
  
The WTO differs fundamentally from the World Bank and the IMF on governance 
system in a sense that it is member driven organisation which little authority has been delegated 
to the secretariat, nearly all WTO councils and committees including the General Council which 
handles the organisation’s day-to-day operations are plenary committees which effectively 
means that decision-making involves the representatives of all WTO members.
90
 
 
The Bretton Woods system of decision making which applies weighted voting method 
discriminates between sovereign member states of the IMF and the World and creates individual 
states which have more say than others in the governance of the these institutions. In  
contrast, the WTO system of negative consensus as a primary tool of decision making and the  
one member-one vote manner applies the international law principle of sovereign equality which  
emphasis on equality of states irrespective if geographical, economic or military might. The 
constitutional documents establishing the WTO do not create classes of different members, each 
country irrespective of when it joined the GATT/WTO or the size of its GDP has equal rights 
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and contributes in terms of weight of the votes on formal decision making structures of the 
multilateral trading system. 
 
It is quite critical to note that in all the trinity organisations that make international 
economic order, informal structures in decision making processes play a major role. The only 
distinction between the Bretton Woods Institutions and the WTO in so far as informal decision 
making structures are concerned is than in the WTO the informality of the said structures has 
been formalised by the involvement of the Director-General who convenes the informal meetings 
which have since adopted the décor of his official boardroom being the Greenroom. On the other 
hand in the WTO and the IMF informal clubs of economically powerful nations such as the G7, 
G20 and BRICS hold informal caucuses to discuss and agree on the agenda businesses of these 
organisation, however, only amongst themselves without the blessing and involvement of the 
secretariats of the IMF and WTO 
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CHAPTER III 
THE GREENROOM AND SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF MEMBERS: FAIRNESS AND 
TRANSPARENCY OF THE WTO DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
3.1.1. Jurisprudential definition of the doctrine of Sovereign Equality 
 
The concept of an international community made up of sovereign States is the basis of the 
intellectual framework for international law.
91
 One of pre-eminent scholars of jurisprudence in 
the previous millennium Hans writing during the interesting epoch of the development of 
international relations viz the 1940’s notes that the term “sovereign equality probably means 
sovereignty and equality, two generally recognized characteristics of the States as subject to 
international law; for to speak of ‘sovereign equality’ is justified only insofar as both qualities 
are considered to be connected to each other.”92 That is to say, from a purely juridical 
perspective, sovereignty refers to a valid legal order that allocates authority and jurisdictional 
competence.
93
  
 
 The second characteristic of the phrase ‘sovereign equality’ as denoted by Kelsen has 
been understood by Cohen to mean that no single sovereign state should be able to prevail over 
all others and impose its will as law.
94
 In essence, the doctrine of sovereign equality is succinctly 
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captured by Lee, wherein he states that ‘sovereign equality is the concept that every sovereign 
state possesses the same legal rights as any other sovereign state at international law’.95  
 
True to his nature of discussing legal philosophy in a rather complicated jurisprudential 
language, Professor Kelsen sums up the concept of equality in international law by stating that 
the principle of equality so formulated is but a tautological expression of the principle of legality. 
That is, the principle that the general rules of law ought to be applied in all cases in which, 
according to their contents, they ought to be applied.
96
 
 
3.1.2. The concept of equality of all nations in the WTO 
 
The WTO, like many other international or intergovernmental organisations is formed by States 
through cession of their sovereignty, transferring some of their functions and power to these 
treaty creatures.
97
 The decisions of representatives of governments and of the European 
Communities members of the Trade Negotiating Committee to establish the WTO are captured 
in the Final Act embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations.
98
 The constitutional document establishing the WTO is the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization hereinafter the ‘Marrakesh Agreement’ or ‘WTO 
Agreement’.99  
 
The equality of all sovereign States which are Members of the WTO is apparent from the 
close reading of the Marrakesh Agreement. Article IV of the WTO Agreement delimitates the 
structure and powers of different organisational bodies of the WTO, at the apex is the Ministerial 
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Conference which is the repository of all powers and functions of the multilateral trading 
body.
100
 The Ministerial Conference meets bi-annually. It is worthwhile to note for emphasis 
sake that this august governance structure of WTO is made up of all constituent states 
irrespective of geographical size, economic and/or military might. 
 
In between the Ministerial Conferences, WTO law provides that the exercise of power 
shall be conferred upon the General Council which is composed once again by representatives of 
all Members.
101
The decision-making structures of the WTO from the reading and interpretations 
of the document establishing it do not provide for discrimination of Members in their 
participation in the running of the organisation.  
 
3.1.3. Deciding in and/or for the WTO: Equal peers and equal footing? 
 
The most interesting and important characteristic of the WTO which is distinguishable from the 
other international economic organisations specifically the World Bank and the IMF is the 
equality of sovereign States in the formal decision making process. A conscious qualification by 
prefixing the decision making process with “formal” as distinguished from informal decision-
making processes is quite critical for reasons that will be clear below. 
 
 The decision-making mechanism of the WTO is enunciated in Article IX of the 
Marrakesh Agreement. The rule in respects to decision making provides that: 
 
WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by consensus followed under 
GATT 1947. Except as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at 
by consensus, the matter at issue shall be decided by voting. At meetings of the 
Ministerial Conference and the General Council, each Member of the WTO shall 
have one vote…102 
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Low simplified the genesis of this provision by noting that the starting point is adherence 
to the “practice” of consensus decision-making only resorting to voting on the basis of one 
Member one vote principle in case of disagreements.
103
 Narlikar argues that the GATT which 
decision-making processes has been adopted without modification emphasised on process-
related fairness rather than outcome related fairness.
104
 The author’s argument is that the 
GATT/WTO formal system of arriving at decisions is formally fair yet wanting in substantive 
fairness thus in a way questions of legitimacy of the decisions made might arise. This view is 
shared by Sharma who points out that negotiating by consensus within a large member WTO is 
not an easy task, but how decisions are made and agreements are reached matters.
105
 
 
The one-Member-one-vote principle which is applied equally across board irrespective of 
the economic size of a Member has been part of the multilateral trading system for as long as it 
has been institutionalised in the manner and form as we know it. The GATT 1947 Article XXV 
on Joint Action by Contracting Parties at sub-article 3 provides that: 
 
Each contracting party shall be entitled to have one vote at all meetings of the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES.
106
 
 
The principle of one-Member-one vote is akin to the democratic principle of universal 
suffrage
107
 and is considered to be a foundational aspect of decision-making in the 
WTO.
108
Another distinguishing feature of the WTO decision-making system is the virtual 
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duopoly given to the Ministerial Conference and the General Council which is embodied with 
decision-making powers and whose membership is open to all Members.
109
 
 
The principle of democratic and equal votes in the WTO system is found across various 
legal provisions in the multilateral trading agreements which makeup WTO law. Narlikar posits 
that such decision-making practices could have worked to the advantage of the developing 
countries who were the overwhelming majority in the expended GATT/WTO. However, such 
numerical advantage was never exploited because the actual practice of decision-making is not 
based on majority voting but on consensus.
110
 On the composition of developing countries 
members in GATT/WTO, Patel notes that at the start of the Uruguay Round in 1986 only 63 
developing countries were members of the GATT.  At the launch of the Doha Round in 2001 
which its conclusion is still eluding the WTO up to date, 106 of the then 144 WTO member 
states were developing countries.
111
 
 
In light of the above, it can be safely concluded that the formal rules in the GATT/WTO 
constitutional documents have never discriminated or distinguished between member states on 
the roles they are to play in the decision-making process. The principle of one-Member one-vote 
presents the most lucid of examples on how the doctrine of sovereign equality in international 
relations can manifest itself. The WTO regime on the face of it operates on the basis of equality 
of sovereign peers. 
 
3.1.4. Consensus in multilateral trading context 
 
The WTO decision-making culture and traditions are inheritance from its institutional 
predecessor, the GATT. Ehlermann and Ehring note that the WTO did not only continue the 
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practice of decision-making by consensus as it had emerged under the GATT 1947, it even 
replaced votes with consensus where votes had existed in the GATT such as in relation to 
accession and waivers.
112
 In agreement with this position Ansong states that the consensus 
principle has become pervasive in its application in WTO decision-making hence becoming the 
norm and not just one of the many decision-making procedures provided for under the WTO 
Agreement.
113
  
 
The development of the tradition of decision-making by consensus emanated from 
practice under GATT 1947. Although the formal rules in Article XXV: 4 of the GATT 1947 
called for the decisions of the contracting parties to be taken by majority votes, or in certain 
cases by two-thirds majority of votes. However, as early as 1959, in practice most decisions were 
taken based on consensus.
114
 The evolution of consensus as a primary mode of decision-making 
in the GATT and the philosophy underlying the same has been discussed by Footer as follows: 
 
Contracting parties to the GATT derive their ability to meet and take decisions 
from their adhesion to a multilateral treaty….The GATT, like the IMF and World 
Bank, was a post-war creation; however, the CONTRACTING PARTIES to the 
GATT never embraced weighted voting for decision-making….Decision-making 
by consensus in GATT practice follows a discernible trend in other international 
fora, beginning in the mid-1960's. Interest in use of the consensus technique 
increased with the number of developing countries entering the international 
system in the wave of decolonization and their accumulation of large voting 
majorities in international organizations…. Majority voting appeared increasingly 
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useless for decision-making in international society because of the danger of 
alienating powerful majorities or producing important disaffected minorities.
115
 
 
The unique history of the GATT distinguishes it from other international economic 
organisation, therefore creates the understanding of equality of members irrespective of the 
initial contributions in monetary terms to the establishment of the organisation. The adoption of 
consensus in the GATT system sought to balance the interests of the economic super-powers and 
the majority developing countries whose contribution to the functional multilateral trading 
system cannot be overemphasised. 
 
3.1.4.1. Consensus not unanimity 
 
WTO practices what is known as ‘negative consensus’. That is to say consensus is deemed to be 
reached on a matter if no objection is voiced at the meeting at which the decision is to be 
taken.
116
 The interpretation of the consensus principle is covered in the first footnote
117
 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement. Jaime
118
 quoting Lafer
119
 extensively asserted that the WTO consensus 
based decision-making system has been characterised as follows: 
 
The WTO consensus-based decision-making process-which finds its highest 
expression in the General Council-constitutes another confidence-building 
mechanism. Consensus is justified due to the fact that WTO’s assets are not 
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financial resources, but legal norms. In order to be effective, such norms must be 
accepted by all members. They cannot be imposed by the heteronomy represented 
by the power of some. They require the autonomy of a pactum societatis, 
resulting in the participation of all. The role of consensus, as a confidence-
building measure, is intimately linked to the question of autonomy, that is, to the 
idea to be free, to quote Rousseau, is to obey ‘la loi qu’on s’est prescrite’. The 
value of consensus, in the perspective of action, is to diminish the fear of member 
to be bound by an undesired decision. Consensus thus contributes to the legal 
security of all WTO members as well as binding force of its norms. 
 
From the reading of the above quote which is the philosophical illumination of the first 
foot-note to Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, the genesis of consensus is not 
premised on the total agreement of the resolution(s) proposed, but the general acceptance of the 
decision to be made, expressed by the quietness of the members in attendance of certain body of 
the WTO meeting. The general acceptance of the resolution as distinguished from total 
agreement might be informed by the nature of binding effect of WTO agreements; the single 
undertaking rule. A Member might not be in total agreement with the resolutions but for a fact 
that “cherry picking” is not allowed in the WTO, because the deal being discussed offers 
something to a Member which is worthy than objecting to a minor issue which is of greater 
interest to other Members. The thinking which informs consensus operating in the minds of 
representatives of states that ‘a deal is better than no deal at all’, hence consensus which is not 
unanimity per se. In light of above line of thinking, Ansong opined that ‘…the failure to reach 
consensus on the Singapore Issues is an example of the problematic nature of consensus 
exacerbated by the single undertaking requirement.
120
 
 
In toto, the preceding discussions from the philosophical basis of sovereign equality in 
Public International Law as adapted in the lex specialis being WTO law to the nature of formal 
decision-making processes in and/or within WTO has been brightly summed up by the current 
and out-going Director-General Pascal Lamy in his speech by stating that: 
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The sovereign equality of states requires formal equality between states of 
different sizes and power. This principle is fully respected at the WTO. While 
most international economic organizations have a restricted body alongside their 
plenary body, the WTO is unusual in that the totality of its Members participate, 
as a matter of law, in all of its bodies – from the Ministerial Conference, which 
meets at least once every two years, to the General Council, which functions 
during the interim period, not to mention each of the councils and committees. All 
of the decisions are taken according to the principle ‘one government/one vote’ 
and by consensus. While it is true that this rule of consensus is responsible for 
certain sluggishness in the negotiations, it does enable all states, whatever their 
share in international trade, to express their views and to participate on an equal 
footing.
121
 
 
Briefly the formal equality of all state as evidenced by the rules of procedure governing 
decision-making and governance in the WTO confirms state compliance with the doctrine of 
sovereign-equality. However, whether indeed the WTO adheres to this principle in relation to 
substantive equality as opposed to black letter law is as contained in WTO treaties and/or 
agreements can only be assessed by probing the actual manner and practice of arriving at 
consensus. 
 
3.2. THE GREEN-ROOM AS MECHANISM FOR CONSENSUS BUILDING 
 
The notion of the ‘Green Room’ is derived from the Director-General of the GATT’s Conference 
Room because of its décor. It has since attained secondary meaning despite the change of the 
décor of the said conference room to refer to smaller meetings convened by the WTO’s Director 
General as consensus building initiative when consensus appear difficult or impossible to attain 
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in a General Council set-up open to all Members. It is not necessary that the Green Room 
meetings be held in that particular conference room.  
 
The informal meetings go against the member-driven nature of the organisation. It empowers the 
Secretariat, the Director-General or the chairmen of committees. This is because: they decide 
which members to invite to informal sessions; and they determine the frequency, conduct, extent 
of participation, and parameters for discussions.
122
 The period between the 1999 Seattle and the 
2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conferences saw an increased use of informal mechanisms through 
which the “key” countries (including those thought to represent key constituencies or coalitions – 
were brought into more select informal negotiating groups – e.g. “Green Room”-type meetings, 
mini-ministerials, etc.
123
 
 
Since its inception in 1995, many developing countries have felt little ownership in the WTO or 
its agreements, growing frustration and anger at the lack of effective participation in WTO 
decision making, particularly for African countries, was a major cause of the breakdown of talks 
at the 1999 WTO meeting of trade.
124
 
 
WTO members have zealously protected the consensus rule, and are clearly 
determined to defend their veto right and high levels of participation or voice. 
Apart from one decision on the accession of Ecuador and a few close calls where 
some countries pushed for a vote, in the first 10 years of the WTO, no voting has 
taken place, not even on waivers or the appointment of director-generals. All 
decisions were taken by consensus. Hence, notwithstanding the relatively light 
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fallback voting rules on the books – ¾ for waivers and interpretations, simple 
majority for most other decisions – all WTO activity occurred with the (albeit 
sometimes tacit) agreement of all WTO members. Even though developing 
countries make up ¾ of the WTO membership, they as well vehemently defended 
the consensus rule.
125
 
 
 Woods notes that even post 1995 after the establishment of the WTO which has retained 
its predecessors decision-making culture including the Green room consultations are usually 
convened at the initiative of the Director General and include the powerful Quad (United States, 
European Union, Japan and Canada) as well as countries deemed to have a vital interest in the 
issue under discussion and countries which have traditionally played a leading role in the GATT 
(such as Brazil and India representing developing countries, and Bangladesh representing the 
least developed countries).
126
 This in effect means that the majority of the developing nations are 
excluded from these core yet informal decision-making processes. 
 
Kaushik observes that the Green Room meeting developed earlier in the GATT years 
when main players decided that it was time to undertake further tariff reduction or make other 
trade rules, the GATT secretariat provided a forum being the Director General’s conference 
room for these main players to undertake informal discussions.
127
 The Green Room comprised of 
up to eight countries until the Tokyo Round, as broader and systematic rule-making issues 
entered the purview of the Uruguay Round, a full Green Room could have had as many as thirty 
(30) countries.
128
From an institutional point of view, the Green Room represented an adaptation 
by the Director General along with the United States of America and the European Community 
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(later European Union) to facilitate agreements among a growing membership on increasingly 
complicated negotiating agenda.
129
 
 
 The Green Room was institutionalised as part of the informal culture and traditions of 
WTO decision-making process, being initiated by the Director General from the Tokyo Round 
which became entrenched in the Uruguay Round.
130
 During the Uruguay Round, the GATT 
employed an informal system of meetings at critical stages of the negotiating process, in which 
small group of countries were invited to thrash out particularly difficult or sensitive issues with 
the objective of working out a compromise solutions into a smaller and intensive set-up.
131
 
  
3.2.1. Composition of the Green Room 
 
The composition of the Green Room is dependent on the issue(s) under discussion. 
Historically the innermost circle of the main players who constituted the core of the Green Room 
and often met even before an issue reached the Green Room is the “Quad” viz the USA, the 
European Union, Japan and Canada.
132
 These countries have always been in attendance of all 
Green Room meeting since time the adoption of this informal procedure during the Tokyo 
Round. During the Uruguay Round other developed countries in the Green Room included 
Australia, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland.
133
While the developed countries have been 
adequately represented and their interests taken a good care of in the Green Room, there is a 
notable development which larger developing economies, particularly Brazil, India and South 
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Africa endeavour to assert themselves for be afforded representation in these exclusive 
meetings.
134
 
 
 Dube observes that the geo-political shift in the world has increased demands for an 
increased representation of developing countries beyond the ‘emerging economies’ and other 
selected smaller countries.
135
 The growing stake of developing countries in the world economy 
has fortified their claim in its management and confidence in asserting that claim, which is a 
recognisable change as historically the poorest developing countries have been slow to assert 
themselves in the GATT and the WTO.
136
 A core preoccupation of those keen to ensure greater 
fairness in the multilateral trading system is the representation of small, weak and poor countries 
in WTO negotiations and in ensuring their participation in the WTO system generate concrete 
benefits for them.
137
 
 
 Developing countries have developed a dislike of the Green Room meetings and similar 
informal exclusive consultative meetings pointing out at the unfairness and the resultant 
inequalities arising in the decision-making process of the WTO due to the invitation-only 
meetings, the outcomes of which are in a way pushed through various coercive measures for 
acceptance by all members.
138
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 The modus operandi of these informal meeting exclusionary, which are meant to build 
consensus on the sidelines of formal negotiations is that they are discriminatory in participants 
selection. Further, they do not give effect to the fundamental principles underlying the WTO of 
equality of all members and equal participation of sovereign states to legitimise and ensure 
fairness in the decision making process. The rationale for developing countries to have been up 
in arms against the system of the Green Room is noted as follows: 
 
The first and most obvious problem with informal consultations is that they can 
lack transparency, and most developing countries have argued that such was 
indeed the case with both the GATT and the WTO. Informal meetings were often 
by invitation only, or through a process of self selection by a small clique within 
the WTO. The most infamous in this genre were the Green Room meetings, 
where the Secretariat often treated the list of the invitees as confidential in order 
to avoid a flood of requests for participation from the excluded. The only way of 
tracing the proceedings of such meetings was through occasional briefings from 
the invited developing countries. As it was in the Green Room that consensus was 
negotiated, which was then presented as a fait accompli in the formal meetings, 
exclusion proved especially costly.
139
 
 
 Laing critically observes that attendance is not on the basis of peer equality of members 
but that the criteria have never been transparent with ‘typical attendants’ that is the 
‘QUAD’.140These countries which attend the Green Room out of some sort of de facto right of 
attendance are developing, major trading economies, which suggests that due to the sheer size of 
their economies they have assumed superiority and ‘enhanced equality’ over their sovereign 
counterparts from developing countries. 
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 The practice of Green Room meetings has overshadowed the earlier observation that 
unlike other International Financial Institutions (IFI’s) the WTO’s decision-making process does 
not discriminate amongst countries on the basis of the size of their economies, military might or 
even geographical size. In light of the foregoing it is necessary to make a suggestion at this 
juncture that the Green Room somewhat has divided participation of members in the WTO 
between developing and developed countries to the detriment of the majority. Few powerful 
economies control the decision-making process informally which results are later on brought to 
the majority who had been sidelined by the process for ratification under the guise of consensus. 
 
3.2.2. Legitimacy and fairness of WTO decision-making process 
 
The WTO Members have been criticized for adopting, during the Uruguay Round, treaty 
provisions that failed to realize a measure of fairness vis‐à‐vis developing countries.141It has 
been observed by critics more often than not that the WTO is ‘pathologically secretive, 
conspirational and unaccountable to sovereign states and their electorate.’142 The prevailing 
opinion that the WTO is not a transparent institution was illustrated in the Seattle riots and 
subsequent failed WTO meeting in 1996.
143
 
 
 The legitimacy of the manner in which the WTO arrives at its decisions as an institution 
has been put to the test by the ensuing intra-organisational challenges to balance the interests of 
the developing and developed countries amid a growing number of members of the WTO which 
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makes it very difficult if not impossible to arrive at a consensus. An institution can claim 
legitimacy to the extent that governments and the public accept it, together with its rules, 
decision-making processes and activities.
144
 Legitimacy of the WTO has been subject of study of 
various author and scholars on International Trade Law, International Relations and International 
Economists among others, Eaglton-Pierce and Nicolaid is made an interesting observation in 
their in-depth study of the institutional culture of the WTO, and in a rather long quotation they 
state as follows: 
 
In the WTO context, discussion of input-legitimacy refers to the procedural 
conditions and scope for democratic voice within the organisation…First, it is 
useful to recall perhaps the ‘major and unsustainable discrepancy’ in the business 
of rule-making and decision-making at the WTO: the coupling of an automatic 
and binding system of laws under powerful surveillance with the informal, ad hoc 
practice of bargaining and negotiation. The importance of informal political 
practices in establishing agendas and codes of conduct within the WTO is 
impossible to overstate, a legacy drawn from the ‘club’ atmosphere of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). But when informality becomes the 
institutional modus operandi, weaker actors are always vulnerable to power-based 
manipulation where there is a lack of transparency. Second, the need to perform 
well in negotiating arenas is, of course, closely tied to the technical resources and 
competences of each Member State. In terms of legitimacy, specific concerns lie 
in several aspects of the negotiating processes, including: the use of Green Room 
forums for select Members, the core protocols on the negotiation of rules, the 
politicising of types of formula, issue linkages, and the role of the Secretariat. An 
additional important – yet overlooked – dimension of negotiation involves timing 
and pace: pressures applied to finalise a Round or reach consensus at a Ministerial 
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Conference can often bear heaviest on those endowed with the fewest resources to 
fully realise the consequences of policy implementation.
145
  
  
The tradition and/or practice of exclusion in the informal consultations and decision-
making structures of the WTO has mostly been blamed for the unfairness it results in, leading to 
the reluctance of the developing countries to accept the decision so reached in their absence 
which are often looked with suspicion in that they are to the sloping benefit to the developed 
countries. That result in doubted legitimacy of the decisions and/or resolutions reached, 
interestingly it has been observed that while the Green Room process has come to symbolise a 
process under which a handful of developed countries disproportionately influenced the outcome 
of multilateral rounds of trade negotiations. It should also be acknowledged that the Uruguay 
Round outcome (to which Green Room process is often linked), was produced by the atypical 
historic circumstances framing the ultimate trade round of the GATT era.
146
 The developing 
countries were not actively participating in the Uruguay Round negotiations notwithstanding 
their numerical majority leaving the conclusion of agreements on few developed countries. 
 
Notwithstanding the inherent unfairness of the Green Room meetings in respect to the 
excluded participation of majority of developing countries, it seems to have been a necessarily 
evil in some instances, including historical events that led to the very formation of the WTO. 
However, the degree of separation between the Green Room process and the inability of smaller 
WTO Members to have their concerns and perspectives reflected in its results, calls into question 
of the legitimacy of WTO rules which in theory, supersede domestic law making processes.
147
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It is imperative to note that the historical context in which the Green Room meetings 
developed has changed, the era which developing countries were not much motivated to take 
active participation in GATT negotiations. The developing countries are demanding their stake 
in WTO rule-making. As an organisation which prides itself for being member driven and equal 
participation of all sovereign nations there should not be difficulty in painting the room greener 
to allow the participants reflects the composition of membership of the WTO. The organisation 
being dominated by developing and transition economies should reflect the realities of 
memberships which will lend legitimacy to the WTO decision-making process. 
 
The internal power dynamics within the WTO however have changed over the years. 
Developing and transition economies have grown confident and since demanded equal 
participation in decision-making process. There are two water-shed events in international 
relations particularly in multilateral trade negotiations which have highlighted the sharp divided 
between developed and developing countries. The fact that developing countries will no longer 
accept decision made for and/or on their behalf in their absence either in the Green Room or the 
dark room somewhere by the powerful nations and some select few developing nations without 
the involvement of the majority. These historical events are the dramatic collapsing of the Seattle 
Ministerial and the Cancun Ministerial. 
 
3.3. CONCLUSION 
 
The exclusion of majority of developing countries from the informal consensus building 
discussions in the WTO where in actual fact agreements are reached by the minority on behalf of 
the majority has led to doubts over procedural legitimacy of the WTO decisions. The famous or 
infamous practice of Greenroom meetings has led to a sharp divide between the traditional power 
brokers within the WTO and the emerging and developing countries which are developing the 
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institutional confidence to challenge and even reject decisions taken in their absence by a club of 
few countries. 
 
           The entrenchment of greenroom meeting which in a way silence the voices and views of 
the majority members of the WTO perpetuate the view that the organisation such as it 
predecessor is a club of the rich. The democratic deficiency resulting from exclusion of the 
majority in the multilateral trading system decision-making process creates institutional inertia, 
stalling progress in negotiations and conclusions of trade agreements. There exists grave 
inequality in the practice of the WTO decision-making notwithstanding the hallowed principles 
of equality of members which the WTO prides itself with, at least on a formal level. In actual 
fact the developing counties despite being in the majority are sidelined due to the exclusionary 
greenroom meeting. 
 
           It is impossible to suggest that there is fairness and transparency in the WTO decision-
making when far-reaching and binding decisions are made when the overarching majority are 
left in the dark about how those decisions are arrived at. The current culture of informal 
consensus building is inherently unfair and seems only to further the interests of to the exclusion 
of the economically weak and numerically strong. 
 
          The boldness of the developing countries in rejecting the greenroom came to the fore in 
Seattle which shall remain in the hallmarks of the history of WTO and also during the Cancun 
ministerial which can be said to be the turning point in the decision-making process of the WTO.  
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CHAPTER IV 
COLLAPSE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN SEATTLE AND CANCUN: REVOLUTION 
AGAINST THE GREEN ROOM? 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
4.1.1. Human face to the WTO: The Seattle Collapse 
 
The third WTO Ministerial Conference was held from November 30 to December 3 1999 in 
Seattle, the United States of America. It was intended to launch the New Round of negotiations 
after the Uruguay Round. The four-day meeting did not reach any conclusion and the conference 
was suspended without any Ministerial Declarations issued.
148
 The dominant image of the 
WTO’s Seattle meeting was rioters in the streets and disarray in the conference hall.149 
 
The unusual interest in the operations of the WTO by civic society was manifested by the 
protests that rocked Seattle, Washington in late 1999.  This was an incredibly significant moment 
in the history of popular protests.
150
 Not only did the protestors succeed in disrupting the 
meetings of the world's most influential trade-governing bodies, but the event drew together 
incredibly diverse constituencies that represented a wide range of interests, many of which would 
seem to be incompatible at first sight.
151
 The scenery of the dramatic and historical external 
resistance to the WTO has been succinctly and vividly captured by Smith in his eloquent 
narration as follows: 
 
On the evening of November 29 1999 Seattle business and political leaders hosted 
an elaborate welcoming party for delegates attending the World Trade 
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Organization's Third Ministerial Conference. At the same time, thousands of 
activists rallied at a downtown church in preparation for the first large, public 
confrontation in what became the "Battle of Seattle." Protesters emerging from 
the overflowing church joined many thousands more who waited, while variously 
dancing, chanting, and conversing, in a cold Seattle downpour to join the march. 
Marchers donning union jackets or rain ponchos that proclaimed their opposition 
to the World Trade Organization and celebrated the "Protest of the Century" filled 
several city blocks as they proceeded to the city's football stadium, the site of the 
WTO welcome party and the target of that evening's protest. An estimated 14,000 
-30,000 marchers formed a "human chain" three or four people across that was to 
encircle the stadium and dramatize the crippling effects of the debt crisis on the 
economies of the global South. The protest deterred more than two thirds of the 
expected 5,000 guests from attending the lavish welcoming event. Although the 
human chain’s symbolism of the “chains of debt” might have been lost on many 
delegates, the efforts of protesters supporting the international campaign to end 
third world debt (“Jubilee 2000") helped to highlight for some protesters and 
onlookers the enormous inequities of the global trading system as they kicked off 
a week of street protests and rallies against the global trade regime.
152
 
 
Protesters came from all over the world, not just the developed countries. They ranged 
from human rights groups, students, environmental groups, religious leaders, labour rights 
activists etc wanting fairer trade with less exploitation and even right-wing protectionist groups 
were there also arguing against the current corporate-led free trade.
153
 Shafaeddin in his 
conference paper
154
 quoted the eminent Yale University scholar in referring to failure of 
international trade negotiations in Seattle who stated that: “what Seattle showed was that there is 
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a lot more angst beneath the surface”.155 Professor Emeritus Summers in his seminal work opines 
that the ‘Battle of Seattle’ was a battle on two fronts, on one front it was a battle between the 
worshippers of efficiency and the missionaries of human and social rights; and one the other 
front, it was a battle between those who pursued the claimed economic gains of comparative 
advantage and those who rejected, a least in part, its economic consequences.
156
 
 
The motive behind the infamous Seattle protest by a global alliance of Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGO’s) was to block and defeat the secretive and highly 
controversial Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI).
157
 The motivating factor behind 
opposing the MAI has been captured as follows: 
 
Global civil society mobilized and defeated the secret and highly controversial 
Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI). The MAI was to be a WTO, Phase 
2, or a more powerful WTO. The powers-that-be behind MAI, the leaders of the 
30 richest countries of the world making up the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), had made a bad miscalculation. They 
thought that they could easily approve the MAI, an agreement aimed at bestowing 
almost absolute rights to TNCs and other investors over and above the rights of 
citizens and countries. The MAI would allow transnational corporations 
unparalleled access to the resources of a country with minimal obligations or 
responsibilities to that country. The MAI wanted to transfer enormous power to 
transnational corporations (TNCs). If the MAI were passed, then that would have 
seriously eroded the sovereignty of nations and citizens.
158
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After the failure to insert investment in the GATT regime in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, a second - and ultimately unsuccessful - attempt to develop a multilateral agreement 
on investment took place in the Uruguay Round which attempt developing states continued to 
strongly resist an investment treaty in the newly created WTO (1995).
159
 Nevertheless, the US 
and, in the course of the Uruguay Round, the EU as well as the other industrialised states become 
convinced of the idea. Investment was back on the international agenda.
160
Many NGOs called 
their “plot” to kill the MAI the Dracula strategy”: stopping the negotiations by simply bringing 
public attention to a treaty proposal that cannot stand up against the light. Not having direct 
bargaining leverage at their disposal, the NGOs tried to use the power of arguments and symbols 
to reach their goals.
161
 A more comprehensive discussion on the resistance by developing 
countries and civic society towards adoption of the MAI which sparked public protest in Seattle 
notes that: 
 
While the need for foreign direct investment (FDI) is generally recognised -- even 
among the sceptics -- the push for an international agreement has been rather 
lukewarm in some countries. This lack of enthusiasm or sometimes even an 
outright hostility could be a serious problem for the international trading system 
and for capital markets. First, the question of MAI divides the WTO member 
countries into those who support the idea of an agreement and those who are 
against it. In other words, this is a divisive issue which could also hamper 
progress in other areas of WTO jurisdiction. Second, the division has gone along 
the lines of important country groupings -- developed versus some less developed 
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countries (LDCs). This, too, is a serious business because of the interest of 
developed countries in having LDCs integrated into the multilateral trading 
system. Third, FDI has been growing dramatically over the last decade or so, 
resulting in a rapid pace of globalisation and a significant contribution of foreign 
capital to investment in many countries of the world. Unfortunately, the growth of 
FDI has been uneven, with some LDCs benefiting more than others, leading many 
people in academia and policy circles to fear that the latter countries, or at least 
some of them, will be ‘marginalised’.162 
 
The exclusionist MAI in that it was largely negotiated by industrialised OECD countries 
without participation of developing nations and inclusion of NGO’s as asserted above had direct 
and indirect repercussions on the excluded constituency. In the opinion of the NGO’s, the human 
population of the majority members of the WTO who had no input in negotiating the agreement 
were to suffer most. As a result, the battle in Seattle was to infuse fairness in the business of the 
WTO by seeking to protect the human interests over business interest of large multination 
corporations of developing countries. The former Director-General of the WTO, Renato 
Ruggiero who had just vacated office in 1999 notes that the presence in Seattle of thousands of 
people from all over the world signalled a new reality, still very much incomplete and 
unbalanced, that is taking shape.
163
 
 
4.1.2. Diplomatic Politics: The Internal Narrative of the Seattle collapse  
 
Wolfe states that the Ministerial meetings are an obvious thread running through the history of 
the multi-lateral trading system, beginning with the Havana Conference that drafted the Charter 
for an International Trade Organisation that never saw light of the day.
164
 The internal narrative 
about the failure of Seattle Ministerial is premised mostly around the problems in the conduct of 
the meeting itself. Raghavan argues that the Seattle Ministerial ended in failure when a number 
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of small economies refused to be manipulated, marginalised and left out of the decision-making 
processes and acquiesces in decisions cooked up in ‘secretive’ so-called ‘green room’ 
processes.
165
 
 
The Battle in Seattle not only took place in the streets, quite importantly within the 
Convention Centre where the ministerial conference was being held at, there were various forms 
of resistance against the major powers dominating the WTO by some of the developing country 
government representatives within the formal ‘negotiating’ processes.166 
 
In many respects, the Seattle meeting was politically premature, as a broad consensus had 
not emanated from the preparatory process in Geneva.
167
The failure to reach consensus at 
preparatory stage was evidenced by the fact that when WTO ministers arrived in late November 
1999, the draft declaration officially on the table was some 32 pages long and contained nearly 
400 bracketed items indicating disagreement among members.
168
Ambassador Amorin, the 
Brazilian Permanent Representative to the United Nations and other International Organisations 
in Geneva in this regard came our rather strongly in a post-ministerial pessimistic view with the 
benefit of hindsight by stating that if one looks at the background and preparation process of the 
Conference, the prospects for its success were never bright.
169
 
 
One of the most contentious and very divisive issues pre-Seattle which had been poised 
to be the ultimate cause of the collapse of the talks, was the insistent inclusion of core labour 
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standards in WTO talks by developed countries.
170
 Some WTO member governments in Europe 
and North America believe that the issue must be taken up by the WTO in some form if public 
confidence in the WTO and the global trading system is to be strengthened through the formation 
of a working group to study the issue of trade and core labour standards.
171
 Developing-country 
officials have said that efforts to bring labour standards into the WTO represent a smokescreen 
for undermining the comparative advantage of lower-wage developing countries and argue that 
better working conditions and improved labour rights arise through economic growth.
172
 They 
say that if the issue of core labour standards became enforceable under WTO rules, any sanctions 
imposed against countries with lower labour standards would merely perpetuate poverty and 
delay improvements in workplace standards.
173
 
 
The recurring issue of legitimacy and fairness of the WTO decision-making process was 
one of the important causes of the ultimate breakdown of talks in Seattle. The Agreements 
defined by Quad states were then forced upon Southern members who were most vulnerable to 
the pressures of these powerful economic actors.
174
  
 
Developed and developing countries were diametrically opposed on what should be 
discussed and negotiated on. The former were of the view that the agenda should  be broadened 
to include what have been termed ‘divisive issues’ such as labour, environment and investment 
while the latter group of countries felt that negotiations should focus on developmental issues.
175
 
Wolfe in this respect posits that the failure of Seattle foundered on the concerns of developing 
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countries that new negotiations were not possible until results of the Uruguay Round had been 
implemented.
176
 
 
4.2. THE MEXICAN VERSION: COLLAPSE AT CANCUN 
 
Mexico hosted the fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in the city of Cancun in September 2003. 
The ministerial came about one and half years after the launch of the Doha Development Agenda 
whose initial date of conclusion was 1
st
 January 2005.
177
 The Cancun Ministerial was part of the 
road to completing the Doha round of trade negotiations initiated in the fourth session of 
ministers in Qatar in 2001.
178
 Cho notes that the Cancun Conference was expected to deliver a 
solid, workable framework to fulfil the Doha Development Agenda and to herald a positive 
signal to the global trading community.
179
 
 
 Notwithstanding the optimism and euphoria during pre-ministerial days, the Cancun 
Ministerial collapsed, failing to address developed countries’ prevailing protectionism in the 
sectors of agriculture and textiles, on which many developing countries depend for their 
subsistence.
180
 Raju observes that the success (or failure) of the Conference depended on the 
negotiations on whether the WTO members agreed on the ‘modalities’ for negotiating new tariffs 
and reducing the farm subsidies of the developed countries under the Agriculture Agreement.
181
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 The Cancun Ministerial Conference was actually an extension of the currently stalled  
Doha Development Agenda.
182The Cancun talks failed  because the agenda of the WTO’s Doha 
Round is complex and ambitious, dealing with issues that have been the most difficult in the 
past, including agriculture, textile tariffs and trade barriers in developing countries.
183
 The 
circumstances and factors that contributed to the meeting in Cancun’s collapse have been neatly 
in the Catholic Agency for Development Report as follows: 
 
The meeting collapsed, just like Seattle, following a North-South split created by 
the unwillingness or inability of the EU and US to hear and respond to developing 
country concerns. If anything, in Cancun the divide was more striking, since this 
time the EU and the US had resolved their differences on agriculture before the 
meeting. However there were also important, and encouraging, differences with 
Seattle, notably the increased unity and clarity of the developing country positions 
in Cancun, which could herald a welcome geopolitical shift in the WTO, and even 
beyond.
184
 
 
The collapse of the Cancun ministerial has been directly attributed to the underlying 
differences in issues to be negotiated on; the opposed interests of the developing countries on 
one hand, and the developed countries, in particular the EU and the US. However, it is 
worthwhile to note that it is not the fact that differences existed per se but the way and manner in 
which the decisions were arrived at that brought about the abrupt end to the Cancun ministerial 
due to failure to agree on text of the proposed resolutions. In that regard Khor notes that, in the 
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end it was the WTO’s lack of transparency and non-participatory decision-making process that 
caused the “unmanageable situation” that led to the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial.185 The 
developing countries refused to be pushed into a corner and have proved that they are now a 
force to be reckoned with.
186
 
 
4.3. DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: CURRENT STATE OF PLAY 
 
The Doha Round is the latest round of trade negotiations which aim is to achieve major reform 
of the international trading system through the introduction of lower trade barriers and revised 
trade rules.
187
 This round of WTO negotiations named the Doha Development Agenda was 
launched in Doha (Qatar) in November 2001.
188
 It is historically significant to note that the Doha 
Round is the first round after the establishment of the WTO in 1995.  
 
Twelve years after the launching of the round of negotiations, no deal has been reached 
by the ever growing membership of the WTO. This is making it the longest running negotiation 
in the post-war era and the end is not in sight as yet.
189
 Members of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) continue to disagree about prospective liberalization in the areas of 
Agriculture and non-agricultural market access (NAMA), and this rift has delayed the discussion 
of other important issues on the negotiating agenda, particularly Services.
190
 The year 2011 was 
seen as an opportunity to conclude WTO Doha trade negotiations, but key divisions again proved 
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insurmountable.
191
 The breadth of issues covered by Doha, however, has made it difficult to 
assemble a package agreeable to the then 153 WTO members.
192
 The general consensus by 
various scholars is that failure to address contradictory interests between developed and 
developing states have made the efforts to achieve the goals set out in the Doha Declaration 
overly difficult to meet.
193
 Developing countries have moved from the periphery of the 
international trade order to its centre.
194
 
 
The Doha Round of trade talks presented a litmus test to all role players, particularly G20 
leaders, of whether the world economies are ready and able to address the lingering question of 
global imbalances in the macroeconomic environment in a cooperative way, and the failure of 
such a test serves as a testimony that the developed-developing divide is too wide to go 
unnoticed.
195
 The international community is ruled by the geopolitical and economic muscular, 
making it incapable of managing macroeconomic imbalances that are persistent. The institutional 
constraints and stumbling blocks to successful conclusion of the current round of multilateral 
trade negotiations have been succinctly stated by Drache and Froese as follows: 
 
…the biggest reason for an inability to conclude a deal in the Doha Round is the 
comparative weaknesses of a single undertaking model of deal-making in relation 
to other forms of multilateralism. The consensus among scholars is that the 
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growth of the multilateral trade system, from the 23 Members that participated in 
the first round of GATT negotiations at Geneva in 1947, to the 123 members that 
completed the Uruguay Round in 1994, to the 150 Members of the WTO today, 
has strained the institution’s multilateral negotiating model considerably.196 
 
The proactive stance taken by developing countries in the 2001 Doha meeting, wherein 
such countries prescribed their interests instead of adopting what was given in the agenda as it 
was shows that all countries, despite the size and macroeconomic strength, are ready to 
negotiate.
197
 Also at the heart of the Doha deadlock are the political concerns of the Chinese and 
US, which are deemed to lack vision.
198
 It has been observed by scholars that until the US and 
Chinese leaders manage to find some room for compromise by loosening their domestic political 
constrains, the Doha will remain deadlocked.
199
  
 
There are differing opinions on the future prospects of the Doha Round of trade 
negotiations. Those who are in support of continuing the Doha Round of trade negotiations hold 
the belief that the potential opportunities on the economic, symbolic, and systemic fronts that are 
presented by the Doha Round talks make it difficult to pack and leave without exploring such 
opportunities.
200
 WTO members expect that a final deal should provide relatively larger benefits 
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for developing countries if Doha is to meet its advertised goal of being a “development 
round”.201  
 
 Dube makes a critical observation when she posits that key to the apparent failure of the 
Doha Development Agenda is the failure of the decision-making process at the WTO.
202
 The 
concern about how to revive/continue or proceed with the Doha Round and the interest in 
exploring how to improve the WTO’s negotiating function have an important systemic 
governance dimension – how to have decision-making that is accountable, legitimate, efficient 
and delivers on the core objectives of the system.
203
That is to say more than the disagreements 
and/or conflicting approaches by developing and developed countries over substantive contents 
of the stalled negotiations, the main problem lies on the procedural aspects of decision making.  
 
4.4. CONCLUSION 
 
 Developing countries have grown assertive, which is quite apparent in the ongoing or the 
negotiations which refuses to finish having gained momentum from Seattle through Cancun 
Ministerial. From the look of things, developing countries are not going to accept decision made 
without their active involvement within the WTO structures exclusively by few developed 
countries as it was the case during the GATT era.  
 
 For progress to be attained in the multilateral trading system and for the WTO to remain 
effective and relevant, it has to become responsive to the demands of the majority developing 
countries. Without reforms in the decision-making process of the WTO the Doha Development 
Agenda seems destined not to bear fruit. The collapse of Doha might not be as dramatic as the 
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Battle of Seattle; however, it is important that it does not fail. Consequences of the failure of the 
current round of negotiations would be dire to the continued existence of the formalised multi-
trading system. 
 
 In light of the foregoing, reforming the WTO appears to be inevitable, legitimacy and 
fairness in its decision-making process is critical for its existence. A way has to be found in 
democratising the WTO in the true substance as contemplated by its constitutional documents. 
The continued growth of WTO makes single undertaking and consensus unworkable and 
impractical.  
 
The Greenroom as a catalyst for building of consensus is unacceptable to the majority of 
members; in fact the use of the exclusive mini-meetings at the behest of the Director-General or 
Chair of Negotiations is a major contributory factor to the revolt of developing countries.  In that 
regard, the WTO has to adapt to the changes in its composition and accept the reality that 
developing countries are not going to be forced to accept decisions they are not in agreement 
with, or quite importantly those they had no input in making. The panacea to the WTO decision-
making legitimacy problems at the moment is reform to the negotiation process to make it more 
transparent and inclusive. 
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CHAPTER V 
LAYING A FRAMEWORK FOR WTO DECISION-MAKING REFORM: 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
5.1 CONCLUSIONS 
5.1.1. Institutional Weakness of Consensus Building 
 
 In practice voting has never taken place in the WTO, some believe that the reason is to 
avoid the implementation of the principle of one Member one vote which developing countries 
are of the view does not reflect real economic powers and weight in the multilateral trading 
system.
204
 Despite the voting procedures in the WTO following the one Member one vote 
principle, the vast array of possibilities comprised in the trade-negotiations arena allow more 
powerful members to exert some influence in the course of the institution.
205
In that regard some 
authors in the field of international trade law argue that the doctrine of equality of state in WTO 
constitutionalism is only a formality; consensus in fact reflects the underlying power relations 
between Members, the powerful nations using it to influence the decision-making process to 
serve their interest.
206
  
 
Historically the poorest developing countries have been slow to assert themselves in the 
GATT/WTO despite the fact that every member formally enjoys an equal say in the development 
of consensus decision-making.
207
 The informal WTO decision-making mechanism particularly 
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the use of the Greenroom meetings which gained prominence during the Uruguay Round and had 
gained centre-stage in the WTO decision making has been adapted and slightly reformed in the 
recent past.
208
 In brevity of language, the manner of reaching consensus has been captured in 
illustrative manner by Kwa as follows: 
 
Decision-making essentially takes place in ‘concentric circles’. First, the US and 
the EU come together to decide on a common position. The circle is then 
expanded to Japan and Canada. They make up the ‘Quad’. After this, the circle is 
enlarged to include other developed countries, followed by friendly developing 
countries (e.g. South Africa, Chile, Singapore etc). This group is sometimes 
known as ‘Friends of the Chair’. And finally, other influential developing 
countries, such as India and Malaysia are brought on board, since they carry 
weight, and it would be impossible for the ‘majors’ to leave them out. China, a 
new member, also falls into this category. The majority of developing countries 
never make it into this circle of decision-making.
209
 
 
This model of decision-making in the multilateral trading system has also been described 
by Blackhurst as ‘concentric circle model’ which starts small and keeps expanding upon 
resolution of issues discussed privately.
210
 The developing countries have expressed 
dissatisfaction and displeasure in the manner and practice of exclusive informal Greenroom 
meetings during the Seattle Ministerial.
211
 These insignificant reforms such as the inclusion of 
large developing countries can be said to be a reaction to the indisputable fact that consensus 
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building worked when the GATT-WTO culture was a rich man’s club.212 The inner circle only 
became controversial after the first WTO ministerial in Singapore, when a Greenroom of 34 
countries left al other ministers loudly wondering why they had come.
213
 
 
In Seattle and Cancun, the practice of Greenroom meetings did not function adequately, 
and there were numerous complaints about lack of information flow out of the room and, in 
some cases, apparent misjudgments as to the ‘true’ positions held by certain parties.214 By the 
Cancun meetings, the environment of consensus building had been radically transformed by the 
Southern countries for which knowledge-based bargaining provided new advantage and leverage 
in the bargaining table.
215
  
 
5.1.2.     Bolting from the Greenroom towards the transparent room: Reforming  
               the decision-making in the WTO  
 
In April 2002 a group of developing countries under the auspices of “The Like-Minded 
Group” delivered a set of proposals which sought to ensure that the pre-ministerial preparatory 
process and the actual conduct of the Ministerial Conferences would be ‘transparent, inclusive 
and predictable.”216 In response to the objections of the developing countries, the WTO 
secretariat introduced some minor changes during the Seattle towards the Cancun Ministerial.
217
 
Sutherland and Sewell note that in Seattle, the WTO Director-General Mike Moore and the US 
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Trade Representative made concerted, good-faith effort to broaden participation of delegations in 
the negotiations with the goal to keep the Greenrooms to a minimum. In Cancun, the penchant 
for improvisation in the WTO procedures was also evident in the selection process of the 
‘Friends of the Chair’ and/or ‘Facilitators’ appointed to organise discussion in identified areas 
with an attempt to keep geographical representation in mind.
218
 Some reforms introduced in the 
informal decision-making processes in the WTO worth discussing are the following: 
 
5.1.2.1. Mini-ministerial's 
 
 Wolfe notes that another interesting innovation is meetings held to provide leadership for 
the WTO, a set that include informal meetings of ministers or senior capital-based officials 
where participation rather than being sectoral or regional is somehow meant to reflect full WTO 
membership, these meetings have come to be called “mini-ministerials” which resemble the 
current Greenroom meetings of ambassadors in Geneva.
219
 This seeks to involve more 
representatives of various countries who would ordinarily be excluded from the traditional 
greenroom. The difference between these mini-ministerials and the greenroom meetings is that 
there is improved transparency on their convening and the business transacted therein. The 
decisions arrived at are likely to have acceptable levels of legitimacy as opposed to those taken 
in highly secretive and exclusionary greenrooms.  
 
5.1.2.2. One-to-One Confessionals 
 
The system of confessionals featured strongly among the new methods introduced to arrive at 
consensus in Cancun.
220
 The intensity of these meetings ensures that a serious problem – even 
though endured by only one smaller country – will find a solution, even if the price paid is a 
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series of long efforts and sometimes very tense situations.
221
 They involve a facilitator 
attempting to meet with country representatives bilaterally to try to shift the discourse to actual 
bottom-lines.
222
 
5.1.2.3. Sharing a seat: Developing country response toward exclusionary Greenroom  
Culture 
 
The lack of transparency and exclusivity of trade negotiations meetings combined with the 
limited resources of weak states meant that developing countries themselves were isolated from 
decision-making processes.
223
 In light of these glaring disparities and institutional incapacities, 
developing countries have now increasingly sought to build coalitions as the primary means of 
improving their representation in the WTO.
224
 
 
 Whilst no proposal for restructuring the WTO have been endorsed, the actual practices of 
negotiation and consensus-building have gradually shifted, the most significant has been the 
proliferation of developing country coalitions and their inclusion as joint-representative 
platforms in the WTO decision-making processes.
225
 The recent emergence of a multitude of 
developing country coalitions reflects fundamental changes in the landscape of developing 
country positions in the WTO and shows that such coalitions are beginning to change the 
organization’s dynamics.226 Nowadays far more countries are willing to invest diplomatic 
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resources into the creation and maintenance of coalitions; additionally, at least some coalitions 
involving developing countries have acquired unprecedented influence and bargaining power 
that goes beyond the sum of resources of the individual members.
227
 
 
 The type of coalitions has also significantly diversified over time, reflecting the more 
complex and broader agenda of trade negotiations and signed agreements., the changing 
membership of the GATT and the WTO, as well as the WTO’s evolving relationship with other 
international entities (for instance UNCTAD) have influenced the style of developing country 
coalitions.
228
 At least some of the coalitions that were active at the Cancun Ministerial had 
already appeared at the Doha, if not befor viz the LMG, the African Group, the ACP, the LDC, 
and the Small and Vulnerable Economies.
229
 As means for negotiation strategy, governments and 
coalitions can continue to attempt to frame negotiations in public opinion by reference to 
principles that favor their positions and counter the campaigns of their adversaries, calling on 
NGOs and the media for help.
230
 Coalition building is based on various considerations and 
factors, in that regards Jones observes as follows: 
 
Coalitions in the WTO can take various forms, and the distinctions are important 
in understanding how they affect the issue in WTO decision-making. Many 
coalitions, for example, form along sectoral or around particular trade issue, such 
as agriculture and services. When coalitions form along single dimension, joint 
representation will be similarly circumscribed. Such coalitions generally 
reflect…”exchange trust”, a calculation of net benefits of the coalition based on a 
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focused negotiating object, as represented in the game theoretical framework 
described above.
231
 
 
More recently, it has become customary for some developing countries to be involved in 
inner circle consultations in their ex officio capacity as co-ordinators of coalitions; this shift to 
explicitly include coalitions in WTO decision-making began with preparations for the Doha 
Ministerial in 2001, and has since become further institutionalised.
232
 Developing countries have 
decided to join coalitions to have a common representation over common issues thus ‘sharing a 
seat’ in the Greenroom as opposed to total exclusion. Blackhurst in consolation to the developing 
countries on the use of coalitions to currently afford them a representation in the greenroom 
metaphorically notes that ‘‘sharing a seat may not be ideal, but it is a lot better than never being 
allowed the room.”233 
 
5.2. REFORMING THE WTO DECISION-MAKING: A LEAP INTO THE FUTURE 
5.2.1. Theoretical context of the discussion for reform 
 
Notwithstanding the opposition towards the prevailing atmosphere of negotiations and decision-
making in the WTO, there has been little action toward radical over-hauling of the WTO 
decision-making frame-work. Birbeck makes an interesting observation which highlights the 
conservativism surrounding the envisaged reforms when she stated: 
 
Recommendations on WTO governance and institutional reform strangely 
provoke fear in the minds of many trade analysts. Some reject that reform is 
necessary; others contend that reform is not politically plausible, that the time is 
not ripe, or that the first priority must be to bolster existing aspects of the WTO. 
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Reform can indeed start by working with what exists, but there is also scope for 
innovation. Those who reject the need for reform risk taking for granted the 
credibility and relevance of the very system they mean to defend. For those who 
suggest waiting, the question they must answer is when the right time to address 
systemic challenges will arrive.
234
 
 
Dube notes that any proposals for reform of the WTO decision-making processes have to 
be understood within the context of its organisational make-up viz the current four main tenets of 
decision-making in the multilateral trading system which is as follows: 
 
• The WTO is a one-member one-vote organisation thereby allowing equal status 
to all members irrespective of their trade shares or economic size. 
• The WTO is a member-driven organisation. 
• Consensus based decision making is the de-facto norm in the WTO. 
• The WTO relies on an elaborate network of informal processes to get to a 
consensus.
235
 
 
 Therefore in seeking to reform the WTO decision-making process consideration of the 
institutional culture and features should be paid regard to and to an extent possible not lost in 
entirety. In academic circles some commentators are of the view that there exists a positive 
correlation between the revival of the currently stalled Doha Development Round and 
exploration on how best to improve the WTO’s systemic governance dimension - how to have 
decision-making that is accountable, legitimate, efficient and delivers on the core objective of the 
multilateral trading system.
236
 As a result, the importance of the need to reform cannot be over-
emphasised. What needs to be discussed suggested and eventually agreed upon are the nature, 
                                                 
234
 Birkbeck CD ‘The Future of the WTO: Governing Trade for a Fairer, More Sustainable Future’, International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 2. 
235
 Dube M ‘The Way Forward for the WTO: Reforming the Decision Making Process’, SAIIA Occasional Paper 
Number 118, July 2012 19. 
236
 Birkbeck C.D, ‘The Future of the WTO: Governing Trade for a Fairer, More Sustainable Future’, International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
74 
 
form and/or shape of the long called for reforms to be implemented for better function of the 
multilateral trading system. 
 
 Any of the proposed reforms to the WTO decision-making process seeking to make it 
more transparent, inclusive and therefore creating legitimate and widely acceptable decisions 
amongst its constituent states should retain the core principles underlying the WTO as an 
international intergovernmental institution. Quite critically a unique quality of being ‘member 
driven’ organisation which distinguishes the WTO from other sister international economic 
organisation viz the IMF and the World Bank should not be lost in the process of reform which 
would alienate the WTO from its membership. 
 
 The formal equality of nations constituting the WTO irrespective of their economic size 
or trading volume is an interesting principle of public international law which is one of the 
overarching principles underpinning WTO law. This principle informs the doctrine of non-
discrimination which is the basis of trade rules emanating from the legislation and jurisprudence 
of the WTO. In light of the foregoing, member states of the WTO are put on equal footing to 
each other reflecting their equal importance to the functioning of multilateralism. It is worth-
noting that the impasse bewildering the Doha Development Agenda and the round of 
negotiations which is refusing to end is a build-up of issues from Seattle through Cancun 
ministerial. The point of contention and/or disagreement though seemingly centered on the 
substance of negotiations in fact boils down to the procedures and processes of arriving at the 
substance.   
 
Developing countries as reflected and discussed extensively above objects to how WTO 
makes its decision, they feel and justifiably so excluded from the process which in practice is an 
anti-thesis of the principle of sovereign equality of WTO members. The proposed thesis is that 
any proposal for reform should consolidate and concretise the practice of equality in multilateral 
trading negotiations. Any deviation from the principle of equality of nations in the WTO system 
is likely to be met with imaginable levels of contempt and rejection amongst the majority of 
members which is made up by developing countries.  
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 An academic consensus exists to the effect that the WTO’s practice of decision-making 
through consensus is no longer easy due to the expanded membership from the GATT days to 
now.
237
 It is quite interesting to note that developing countries are not desirous for the scrapping 
of consensus as the primary manner of deciding over issues in the WTO. This proposition is 
supported by Liang who notes as follows: 
 
…the question of whether modifications should be made to the consensus 
principle on which WTO decision-making is based, or whether, in those cases 
voting is foreseen, it should be used more readily in order to avoid blockages and 
improve efficiency. However, given the implications of adopting alternative 
approaches to decision-making, most WTO members expect that consensus will 
remain the rule. It would be inconceivable that the WTO would resort to voting to 
break any impasse.
238
 
  
 The above proposition has been received by some commentators with academic surprise 
considering the fact that developing countries have been complaining bitterly of being excluded 
from consensus building mechanism. In that regard one might expect them ordinarily to call for a 
decision-making model which allows them as a majority to dominate WTO proceeding and most 
probably use their numerical power to excise majoritarian tyranny through voring against the 
developed countries which have dominated GATT/WTO system over the past forty year despite 
being in the minority. This paradox was discussed and justified by Dube in her observation that: 
 
It is interesting to note that developing countries in particular are very keen on the 
retention of consensus in decision-making, despite its current inefficiencies and 
marginalising effect, because they believe this to be their only means of ensuring 
that their voices are heard. This is mostly a practical consideration and is based on 
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the understanding that the voting system would never work in the context of the 
WTO.
239
 
  
 The suggestions and recommendations for reform that aims at improving the participation 
of the developing countries and alleviating the effects the damaging practice of Greenroom 
meetings have on the interests on developing countries must chiefly among other considerations 
recognise the interests of developing countries. As discussed above, developing countries’ view 
of reforming the WTO decision-making process should retain consensus as a primary manner of 
making decisions. Any proposal for reform that abolishes consensus, or dilute the power that 
consensus grants to developing countries over their developed counterparts seems that it will not 
receive acceptance.  
 
 From the developing country point of view, the idea of reform is to grant them access in 
the decision-making process without taking what they already have, it is not the tool that they 
seek to discard but how the tool is used that they wish it be made more transparent and open to 
all irrespective of the size of the economy or volume of trade a member has. Developing 
countries are strong supporters of the consensus practice as it provides them with the assurance 
that they will not be confronted with decisions that may be detrimental to their interests.
240
 
 
5.3. SUBSTANTIVE REFORM PROPOSAL: A TWO-TIER APPROACH 
 
The institutional reform agenda is not a technical, legalistic or bureaucratic matter that can be 
dealt with without taking into consideration of the political demands and concerns driving 
divergent perspectives and expectations about the end goal(s) of the WTO.
241
 What has to be 
kept in mind is that a proposal may appear to be sound, yet when it comes down to actually 
reforming the WTO, one of the main questions to be considered is whether the developing 
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nations themselves consider it politically feasible and in their best interest.
242
 The decision-
making reforms proposed at this point which tries to balance their political interest and 
economics and trading considerations are; consensus-critical mass; and; creation of WTO 
Consultative Board. 
 
5.3.1. Critical Mass: A tradition of majority voting without a majority rule 
 
The Warwick Commission hereinafter “the Committee” on the need to reform consensus and the 
exercise of veto by members has the following to say: 
 
Consensus-based decision-making can be cumbersome if the need for a consensus 
enables a single player or a few players to block outcomes and stifle progress. 
Preventing a decision from being taken may be entirely legitimate where vital 
interests are at stake; the more so if there is a shared perception among a 
significant group of countries that a particular outcome is undesirable. But 
equally, blocking may lack legitimacy where its aim is more to prevent others 
from moving an agenda forward than it is about avoiding a policy outcome 
perceived as harmful by those exercising a veto.
243
 
 
The Warwick Report
244
 demands that results of critical mass negotiations shall not impact on 
“the existing balance of rights and obligations” and that the rights acquired by the signatories 
“shall be extended to all Members on a non-discriminatory basis, with the obligations falling 
only on signatories”.245 The so-called envisioned critical mass model of decision-making in the 
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multilateral trading environment refers to a practice is where countries refrain from blocking 
consensus where critical mass of countries support a proposed change.
246
 In this aspect Ansong 
notes quite corrects that: 
 
The point was made earlier that the advantage of the consensus principle lies in its 
ability to block an objectionable direction in WTO policy, especially where a 
sizeable number of Members do not favour such a move. It was however argued 
that where an overwhelming majority is in favour of decision with only one or a 
few objecting, it presenting a problem in that, progress can be blocked by a small 
number. One proposition for dealing with this is the critical mass concept. The 
concept holds that where an overwhelming majority is in favour of a decision, the 
few objecting Members should refrain from blocking progress.
247
 
 
It has been observed that the earliest appearance of a critical mass approach was in the 
Tokyo Round (1973-79) when non-tariff measures were negotiated including among others 
technical barriers to trade, customs valuation, import licensing, anti-dumping and subsidies and 
countervailing measures.
248
 Low further goes on to note that the MFN rights of GATT 
contracting parties were protected by a decision of the 28
th
 November 1979 (L/4905) which 
explicitly stated that the existing rights and benefits of contracting parties which are not parties 
to the agreements entered through “critical mass” manner are not affected by those 
agreements.
249
The Committee explicitly stated that they do not believe that any voting system 
would be desirable in the context of critical mass decision-making.
250
 Professor Roland in 
discussing the nexus between single undertaking and the proposed critical mass approach has the 
following to say: 
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The emphasis here is to preserve the single undertaking approach enough 
to allow cross-sectoral bargaining while letting some individual Members 
opt out from making concessions under some agreement. Once critical 
mass of Members agrees on a complete package, some countries could be 
allowed to opt out certain agreement or making concessions under these 
agreements.
251
 
 
In light of the fore-going, it becomes clearer that the adoption of critical mass 
presupposes some sort of departure from the principle of single undertaking. Single Undertaking 
in the context of the WTO means that every item of the negotiation is part of the whole and 
indivisible package and cannot be agreed separately, and also that upon accession a country 
wishing to become a member of the WTO has to accept unequivocally the entire agreements 
entered into multilaterally without exception.
252
 Stoler posits that using the single undertaking 
and the creation of the WTO to force developing countries to accept all of the WTO’s new 
obligations was their single biggest mistake; the inapplicability of the one-size-fits-all model has 
created problems for negotiations, for implementation and for decision-making.
253
  
 
The protection of the interests of the developing countries to participate in the critical 
mass decision-making proposed model as a variant of consensus in the WTO has been 
considered by the Warwick Committee in its report. The committee advised that the WTO 
membership should collectively undertake to provide any necessary technical support, capacity 
building and infrastructural needs in order to favour the participation of developing countries so 
wishing to participate in an agreement and derive tangible benefits from such participation.
254
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Further the Committee in a recommendation which might be of high beneficial value to 
developing countries who might not be in a position to bind themselves in the initial critical mass 
concluded agreements to later ‘opt-in’, that is to say those countries which initially opted-out 
shall have unchallengeable and unqualified right to join the accord at any time in the future on 
terms no more demanding than those undertaken by signatories to the accord in question.
255
 
 
It is submitted that the proposed critical mass reform to the consensus coupled with single 
undertaking principle will likely protect the interests of developing countries who would 
otherwise not be in a position to strenuously bind themselves through single undertaking 
initiative, but rather allow them to abstain from certain WTO agreements they are uncomfortable 
with. It is also critical to note that the abstainers will not be left out in the cold forever, but shall 
remain entitled to initial and ratify the said agreements when they are politically and 
economically ready to do so. From the developed countries perspective, they will no longer feel 
constrained and frustrated by the exercise of veto-power of developing countries over issues they 
are not in a position to accept as yet.  
 
This mechanism provides an opportunity for small developing economies with limited 
negotiation capacity to focus on the aspect and sectors that are most important to them while 
knowing that they will not be subject to problematic commitments in other areas that they had no 
opportunity or capacity to bargain for.
256
  
 
It is further opinioned that the embarrassment and collapse of Seattle might have never 
been necessary had this been the primary decision-making mechanism of the WTO for reason 
that developed countries could have negotiated and agreed on Singapore Issues with the 
participation of developing countries which were in a position to continue with such agenda 
items. On the other hand issues of interest to developed countries could have not been thrown out 
with other rejected issues. 
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The constitutional possibility of applying the critical mass concept without the necessity 
of amending the WTO Agreement is through the application of the provisions in Article X of the 
WTO Agreement regarding amendment that alter rights and responsibilities.
257
  
 
5.3.2. Creation of a Management Body 
 
As a membership driven organisation, the WTO does not have an executive body or management 
board to steer it or to interact in a regular and purposeful way with civil.
258
 The Sutherland 
Report recommended the establishment of a senior officials’ consultative body whose main 
functions would be to discuss political and economic matters, provide some political guidance 
and facilitate transition of negotiations taking place at WTO headquarters to the Ministerial 
Conference.
259
 The Sutherland Commission was an officially appointed consultative board 
reporting to the WTO’s Director-General engaged to undertake institutional stock taking of the 
WTO and to propose how to make the WTO more efficient and relevant going forward. 
 
 A consultative board proposed by the Sutherland Commission seeks to bridge the gap 
between the Ministerial Conferences as a transparent and inclusive consensus building 
mechanism. On the complexion that the proposed body is to take, Hoekman explains that: 
 
There are two flavors to proposals along these lines. One is to emulate the 
management structure of the IMF or World Bank, in which a Board of 20 to 30 
representatives is given decision-making powers. The other is to use a board as an 
instrument through which to identify compromise positions in negotiations, 
suggest solution when WTO councils or committees fails to achieve consensus, 
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engage in strategic thinking and help to set priorities to further the mandate of the 
organization.
260
 
 
 It is worthwhile to contextualise the suggestion on the basis of the afore-stated proposal 
in that consensus as proposed to be reformed is to be implemented as circumscribed as critical-
mass of members minus the single undertaking approach. In this light, the consultative body is to 
be used to enhance and build-up the critical mass of issues between the Ministerial Conferences. 
The consultative body or bodies as envisioned will be constituted by members over issues they 
are interested one which they intend supporting to build up a critical-mass and enter into 
agreements regarding such trade issues they have immediate negotiating issues over. 
 
 To make the consultative bodies inclusive they need not be permanent as the critical mass 
mode suggests that there cannot be permanent negotiating interests in the absence of single 
undertaking approach to multilateral trade negotiations. The permanence of cluster consultative 
body shall in this sense survive during the life of the negotiating round. The critical-mass idea 
presupposes that it is unlikely that all membership be interested in all issues in negotiations as 
countries have an option of ‘opting out’ from negotiations when the issues in discussions are not 
of economic and/or political importance to it until it deem to enter into such agreement and 
commits itself later on. 
 
5.4. OVERALL CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
For the developmental agenda of the currently stalled round of WTO negotiations it has to reflect 
the interest of the developing countries which forms the majority of the membership of the 
multilateral trading system. It is the developing countries which understand and know more than 
anyone else the developmental issues and challenges they are faced with, therefore leaving them 
out in the cold when developed countries are locked up in the greenrooms does not in one way 
assist in pushing the development agenda. 
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 It has been recognised that for developing countries to alleviate poverty of their 
populations and improve their economies they need to be active in the multilateral trading system 
and engage in international commerce, thus requiring them to liberalise their economies. It is 
often touted that it is ‘trade not aid’ that can sustainably do away with poverty in developing 
countries, it therefore boggles the mind who these economically weaker nations are to trade 
internationally is they are excluded from the rule making of international trade. 
 
 In light of the foregoing it is submitted that the insignificant contribution of developing 
countries in the volume of trade in world is not due to their disinterest in taking a significant role 
in trade, their interest is reflected by their sheer number in the membership of the WTO. 
However, their failure to make a considerable impact in international business and commerce is 
due to the fact that they are excluded where it matters, decision-making processes of the WTO. 
To further the development agenda of the WTO translating it from rhetoric into tangible and 
concrete results the decision-making processes and procedures of the WTO have to be reformed 
to make them open, transparent and inclusive of the majority interest in the international trading 
system and institutional frame-work. 
 
 It is rather impossible to play the game which its rules one is not aware of and does not 
even appreciate. The current informal rule-making mechanism in the WTO system serves the 
interests of those who make the rules. Multilateral negotiations are not a charitable exercise; it is 
inconceivable how the interests of the non-greenroom invitees would be taken care of.  For the 
equality of member’s mantra and member driven philosophy of the WTO to be realised 
reforming the decision-making process to include the interests of the developing countries 
becomes inevitable. 
 
 The reluctance by the minority developed countries which are content with the status quo 
to reform the decision-making process from being elitist to being inclusionary and transparent 
which results shall be legitimately accepted decisions by the majority is a major contribution to 
the stalling of the Doha Development Agenda or the Doha Round of Negotiations. The WTO is 
yet to conclude a successful round of negotiations after its inception in 1995; however, it has 
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found itself embroiled with shameful pictures of developing countries revolt in two Ministerial 
Conferences already.  
 
 This research has attempted to illustrate that notwithstanding the existence of formal 
equality in the WTO Agreement which seeks to protect at least on a formal black letter law 
perspective, in reality arising from the practice of the WTO as adopted from its predecessor there 
is striking inequality amongst members. There exists an ‘institutional apartheid’ resulting in the 
tyranny of the minority over the majority membership of the WTO. 
 
 Furthermore, the research has by way of examples and references to pervious failed 
Ministerial viz Seattle and Cancun a ‘liberation struggle’ by the majority who are fighting to free 
themselves from the exclusionary and discriminatory practices of the multilateral decision-
making processes. The institutional infighting within the WTO over the need to reform and take 
into consideration the trading interest of the majority by involving them in an open and 
transparent decision-making system which shall be a departure from the current state of affairs is 
continuously blocking progress in the multilateral trading area. 
 
 The argument raised by this research is that the Doha Round has stalled much not over 
the issues but on the procedure adopt to arrive at the issues on the Agenda. The majority is of the 
view that a round of negotiations cannot be purported to be of their developmental interests 
while those seeking to develop are excluded from negotiating about their own development.  
 
 Moreover, developing countries are not in any position to accept any change in the 
current WTO decision-making model which shall vest more power in the hands of the minority 
akin to the Bretton Woods institutions viz IMF and the World Bank. The general consensus 
within developing countries as reflected in the substantive introductory chapter of this research is 
that the entire international economic system and its institutions have to be reformed to reflect 
the true composition of membership and deal away with the disparity between few developed 
countries and majority developing members. The impending reforms to the weighted voting 
systems of the WTO and IMF are not in any way different from the WTO’s need to reform its 
formal and informal decision-making structures. 
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 Finally, workable areas of reforming the decision making process of the WTO to 
safeguard the interests of member states irrespective of their economies and size have been 
suggested and proposed. This research makes an unequivocal argument that unless the decision-
making process of the WTO is reformed to take into consideration the interests and equal 
participation of the global south members little or totally no progress in the current round of 
negotiations and going forward shall be realised. 
 
In conclusion it is submitted that a question is not whether the WTO’s decision-making 
procedures have to be reformed, but how they can be reformed in a manner that is acceptable the 
‘critical mass’ of members. The said reforms are overdue, if the membership is interested in 
saving the round of negotiations which have stalled inordinately longer than usual, the majority 
has to be appeased and the greenroom has to be brighten and be transformed into a transparent 
and accommodating room. The developing countries have shared a seat in the greenroom more 
than it is necessary, they now need their own comfortable seat around the negotiating table to 
further the developmental agenda in pursuit of the “trade not aid” principle for the own 
development. 
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